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1. INTRODUCTION
Uniqueness and freedom have as their consequence that one can
never regard other people merely as means, but must always
treat them as ends in themselves. As beings they have the
fundamental authority to define their existence and its meaning
themselves, including their own values and their own morality.
In this way it becomes not morality but ethics-understood as
the meta-discussion of morals and how they function together in
a common system, which is the universal basis for any
discussion of values. We must therefore accept that we can find
no universal morality. 1
In 1997, Minnesota took up the far-reaching responsibility of studying
the impact of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) and Fetal Alcohol Effect
(FAE) on the state. 2 The first Governor's Task Force on Fetal Alcohol
1. Cybernetics and Human Knowing, cited in To BE REAL 3 (Rebecca Walker ed.,
1995).
2. Fonner Governor Arne H. Carlson fonned a Task Force on Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
in 1997. See STATE OF MINNESOTA, SUFFER THE CHILDREN: THE PREVENTABLE TRAGEDY OF
FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME (Feb. 1998) [hereinafter SUFFER THE CHILDREN]. First Lady
Carlson is also a Referee in Minnesota District Court.
Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) and Fetal Alcohol Effect (FAE) are physical and
mental birth defects that are the result of a woman's ingestion of alcohol while pregnant.
See The National Organization on Fetal Alcohol Syndrome [hereinafter NOFAS Fact
Sheet], Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Fact Sheet [hereinafter NOFAS Fact Sheet] (visited Mar. 1,
1998) <http://www.nofas.org/stats.htm>.ltis unknown how much alcohol consumption
during pregnancy triggers the onset of FAS or FAE. Therefore, most studies and experts
suggest that women should not drink at all while pregnant. See id. FAS is considered to be
"the leading known cause of mental retardation." /d. FAS and FAE are not genetic~ a
pregnant woman must ingest alcohol, a teratogen, in order to expose a fetus to FAS and/or
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Syndrome (FAS Task Force or Task Force) was an advisory group
comprised of forty-six individuals representing all branches of state
government, the legal, medical, educational and social service
communities, as well as interested members of the general pUblic. 3 Among
the diverse goals of the FAS Task Force were to hold open hearings across
Minnesota and then to introduce new laws in the 1998 state legislative
session to fund public awareness campaigns, increase community service
programs, regulate maternal behavior, train health care professionals,
educators, and social workers, and create more treatment opportunities for
pregnant women and their FASIFAE-affected children. 4
However, these laudable efforts are clouded by two actions-one
successful, one failed for the meantime-which invite the ever-expanding
national conflict between maternal and fetal rights deeper into Minnesota,
and further encourage the emerging national policy endorsing punitive and
coercive responses to maternal substance abuse. The successful action is a
new law that provides legal immunity to health-care professionals who
report pregnant women with drinking problems to the Maternal Child
Substance Abuse Project or to a welfare agency.5 The law is similar to an
FAE. See Governor's Task Force Meeting on Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, Sept. 23, 1997
(minutes).
Symptoms associated with FAS include: "organ dysfunctions, growth deficiencies
before and after birth, central nervous dysfunctions resulting in learning disabilities and
lower IQ, and physical malformities in the face and cranial areas. In addition, children may
experience behavioral and mental problems which progress into adulthood." Id. FAE
encompasses a similar set of symptoms as FAS but FAE-affected individuals do not exhibit
the distinctive physical malformities associated with FAS. See id. See Section II for further
details on FAS and FAE.
3. For a complete FAS Task Force member list see SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2,
at 2.
4. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2. See also Susan Carlson, Carlson
Administration Has Been Friend of Women's Health, STAR TRIB., Mar. 7,1998, at 19A.
A centerpiece of our proposal is to provide services for chemically
dependent pregnant women and w-omen with children, services that are
lacking in Greater Minnesota and in some parts of the metropolitan area ...
Programs like these will help women get prenatal care as well as services,
such as child care, transportation, mental health, and whatever else they need
to remain chemically free.
S.B. No. 3346 appropriated $5 million to FAS-related programs. S.F. No. 3346, 80th Leg.,
3d Engrossment (Minn. 1998). For the text ofthe bill see infra note 74.
5. See HP. No. 3645 subd. 4 (Minn. 1998).
Any person reporting in good faith and exercising due care shall have
immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might result by
reason of the person's actions pursuant to this section. No cause of action
may be brought against any person for not making a report pursuant to this
section.
Id.

"Pregnant women who abuse alcohol would be reported for chemical-use assessment
or to a local welfare agency." Robert Whereatt, Fetal Alcohol Reporting Bill Goes to
Governor, STAR TruB., Apr. 1, 1998, at 3B. See also Conrad de Fiebre et aI., Legislative
Roundup: A Quick Guide to How Key Issues Were Resolved, STAR TRIB., Apr. 10, 1998, at
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existing statute granting immunity to medical practitioners for reporting a
pregnant woman using controlled substances. 6 According to its sponsors,
the purpose of the alcohol abuse bill is to prompt referrals for treatment and
education. 7 However, the conceivable long-term result is that pregnant
women who drink will be deterred from seeking vital prenatal care and
personal treatment for fear of losing their parental rights (of the newborn or
of children they already have), losing temporary or permanent public
benefits and, as seen in some states, being subject to criminal prosecution. 8
Furthermore, the threat of liability-free reporting compromises the
confidential physician-patient relationship.9 The FAS Task Force has
18A. The Task Force report includes a proposal for mandatory reporting of alcohol use
during pregnancy that would give the woman an opportunity to voluntarily receive
treatment. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 16. The report defines alcohol abuse
as meeting one of the following conditions:
[A woman]
1) requires detoxification during pregnancy
2) habitually consumes three or more drinks at one time since knowing of
pregnancy
3) refuses to stop excessive drinking during pregnancy
4) appears intoxicated based on two or more of the following indicators:
odor of alcohol, slurred speech; disconjugate eyes (eyes do not track
together); impaired balance; difficulty remaining awake; consumption of
alcohol; responding to sights or sounds that are not actually present; or
extreme restlessness, fast speech or unusual belligerence.
Id.
6. MINN. STAT. § 626.5561 subd. 5(a) (1997). Unlike the alcohol reporting law, this
statute does not provide immunity to persons failing to make a report. Id. at subd. 5(b).
7. MINN. STAT. § 626.5561 subd. 5(b). The Bill's chief sponsor was Representative
Wes Skoglund, DFL-Minneapolis. See id. "If the woman doesn't comply with a plan drawn
up by the agency, the county can use civil commitment procedures to require treatment." de
Fiebre, supra note 5, at 18A.
8. See Interview with Deborah Thorp, M.D., Department Chair, Obstetrics and
Gynecology, Park-Nicollet CliniclHealth System Minneapolis, Minnesota, (Apr. 7, 1998)
(Notes on file with author). See also Patricia A. Sexton, Imposing Criminal Sanctions on
Pregnant Drug Users: Throwing the Baby Out With the Bath Water, 32 WASHBURN L.J.
410,420-22 (1993); David F. Chavkin, For Their Own Good: Civil Commitment of Alcohol
and Drug-Dependent Pregnant Women, 37 S.D. L. REv. 224, 244 (1992). See generally
James M. Wilton, Compelled Hospitalization and Treatment During Pregnancy: Mental
Health Statutes as Models for Legislation to Protect Children from Prenatal Drug and
Alcohol Exposure, 25 FAM. L.Q. 149 (1991).
[P]rison is not the answer to the problems of high risk pregnant women,
including substance abusing or dependent women. Punitive strategiesincluding incarceration, mandated treatment, or withdrawal of public service
benefits-which at times have been advocated to force high risk pregnant
women to modify their potentially risky health behaviors (such as substance
abuse) in order to improve the health of the fetus, may actually 'backfire' by
causing high risk women to avoid health and social services that could be
helpful to them.
Sandra L. Martin et. aI., The Effect of Incarceration During Pregnancy on Birth Outcomes,
PUB. HEALTH REPORTS, July/Aug. 1997, at 340.
9. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02 subd. l(d) (1997). "A licensed physician or surgeon ...
shall not, without the consent of the patient, be allowed to disclose any information or any
opinion based thereon which the professional acquired in attending the patient in a
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acknowledged that "prenatal intervention should not be punitive," yet laws
expanding legal immunity send the opposite message, one that detracts
conspicuously from an overall positive program of cooperative public
measures. 10
The FAS Task Force also sought to expand Minnesota's Civil
Commitment Act to include pregnant women who drink by modifying the
definition of a "chemically dependent person."ll Under the proposed civil
commitment procedure, a woman who cannot or refuses to stop drinking
would be referred for chemical screening and assessment, which could
possibly lead to involuntary placement in a treatment program for the
duration of her pregnancy.12 It is certainly true that pregnant women need
access to alcohol and substance abuse treatment, especially women living
in low-income communities. 13 However, in the related contexts of civil
professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable the professional to act in that
capacity . . . ." Id. According to the Hippocratic Oath required of all physicians,
confidentiality is a hallmark of the profession: "All that may come to my knowledge in the
exercise of my profession or outside of my profession or in daily commerce with men,
which ought not to be spread abroad I will keep secret and will never reveal." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 799 (26th ed. 1995). See also Robert Whereatt & Gordon Slovut,
Drastic Steps Aim to Fight Alcohol Use in Pregnancy, STAR TRIB., Feb. 6, 1998, at lB.
10. SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 23. "A judgmental attitude will sabotage
prevention and treatment." Id.
11. !d. at 15. The Task Force recommended the following:
Expand the Civil Commitment Act to allow for a pregnant woman unable to
stop abusing alcohol to be placed in the least restrictive alternative necessary
to receive appropriate treatment. Revise the definition of 'chemically
dependent person' to include a pregnant woman who has engaged in acts of
alcohol abuse (as defined in the proposal for mandatory reporting). Include
an evaluation component in any legislation implementing this expansion of
the Civil Commitment Act.
!d. See also MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 (1995).
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed patient
is a mentally ill, mentally retarded, or chemically dependent person and, that
after careful consideration of reasonable alternative dispositions, including
but not limited to, dismissal of petition, voluntary outpatient care, informal
admission to a treatment facility, appointment of a guardian or conservator,
or release before commitment ... it finds there is no suitable alternative to
judicial commitment, the court shall commit the patient to the least
restrictive treatment program which can meet the patient's treatment needs .
Id. at subd. 1.
12. See Whereatt & Slovut, supra note 9, at lB.
13. See Chavkin, supra note 8, at 240.
Treatment programs are not generally available to serve alcohol and drugdependent women seeking treatment. Those programs that do exist all too
frequently screen out pregnant women for admission. Public and third-party
payment programs all too often do not cover or fail to fund the very services
needed to treat dependence or addiction.
Id. "I'm worried that it's not going to be women of privilege who get reported .... " Susan
Wolf, Professor of Law and Medicine, University of Minnesota, quoted on Minnesota
Public Radio, April 10, 1998. "Although white women abuse substances at higher rates,
women of color are ten times more likely to be reported to law enforcement or child welfare
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commitment and mandatory reporting, a treatment expansion proposal
treads uncomfortably close to abridging a woman's civil rights. 14 Although
the Minnesota legislature declined to enact a civil commitment measure
during the 1998 session, it is by no means a non-issue. The mere
suggestion of a punitive or coercive approach opens the door to more
troublesome outcomes in the future, if only by virtue of the continual trend
toward polarization of fetal and women's rights in this country and the
demonstrated tendency to discriminate on the basis of class and race in
reporting and treatment contexts. IS
This paper explores the problems inherent in a state interventionist
approach to prenatal alcohol use and abuse by women. 16 In recent years, it
has become evident that the public expects government and legal systems
to enact and enforce tougher laws to curb women's behavior during
Punitive and coercive measures are increasingly
pregnancy. 17
officials, . ,," Lisa Janovy Keyes, Rethinking the Aim of the "War on Drugs": States'
Roles in Preventing Substance Abuse by Pregnant Women, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 197, 208
(1992),
14. See Whereatt and Slovut, supra note 9, at lB.
But what about a pregnant woman who is not an alcoholic yet refuses to stop
drinking?
Sen. Don Betzold, DFL-Fridley, an authority on civil
commitment law, said courts generally have approved commitment laws that
protect patients. But, he asked, at what stage of drinking would courts find
commitment of a pregnant woman permissible?
Id.
15. See Whereatt, supra note 5, at 3B. On the issue of involuntary civil commitment for
alcohol treatment during pregnancy, Representative Skoglund stated, "I don't think we can
do that in this world today. Big Brother stepped in too far." Id. The Minnesota Medical
Association also declined to support the civil commitment portion of the FAS Task Force
recommendations. See Pamela Miller, Medical Group Backs Some Ideas of Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome Report, STAR TruB., Feb. 8, 1998, at 2B. See also Jean Reith Schroedel & Paul
Peretz, A Gender Analysis of Policy Formation: The Case of Fetal Abuse, 19 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'y & L. 335, 340 (1994) (providing a feminist response to involuntary civil
commitment); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1432-36 (1991)
(discussing the disproportionate impact of civil commitment on poor black women).
16. The focus of this paper will be on the use and abuse of alcohol during pregnancy.
Many of the cited sources contemplate controlled substance use and abuse during pregnancy
as well as related cases where state interests in fetal rights have come into conflict with a
woman's behavior. However, these sources advance theories and issues that are applicable
to discussions concerning the subject of drinking during pregnancy.
17. Priscilla Smith, a staff attorney with the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy in
New York, says that prosecution of pregnant women for behavior that is harmful to their
fetuses began during the mid-1980s. See Judy Peres, State Role Regulating Pregnancy
Thwarted: Jehovah's Witness Mom Wins Appeal, CHI. TruB., Mar. 29, 1998, at 1C. Most
courts rejected these prosecutions by "ruling that a fetus is not a person under criminal
statutes." Id. However, recent decisions have marked a change in some courts' approaches.
See cases cited infra at note 18. See also Sharon Krum, Women: A Deadly Addiction, THE
GUARDIAN (LONDON), Aug. 7, 1997, at T4. "[T]he new zeal by American prosecutors to
lash out at mothers who commit foetal [sic] abuse is rooted in anger rather than in
compassion and common sense. 'Clearly there is a sentiment that people are not taking
responsibility for themselves or their babies .... '" Id. (quoting Priscilla Smith, who heads
the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy in New York City and represents Deborah
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commonplace across the United States. I8 Related cases have placed state
interests in protecting the rights of a fetus in direct conflict with a woman's
rights of privacy and bodily integrity, further calling into question
community and personal values surrounding the concept of maternal duty.I9
In a society where one's actions during pregnancy are scrutinized as a
matter of public policy and obligation, it is no longer possible for the status
of motherhood to belong to the individual woman. 20 The fine line between
morality and legality has disappeared, leaving a pregnant woman in a
politically vulnerable position where her self-determination is negated by
the 'greater good' of the law?I Finally, in an environment where extreme
criminal and civil 'retaliatory' actions become the norm, there can be no
guarantee that the deterrent, utilitarian and rehabilitative goals of
punishment will prevail. Future harms are only addressed in an overbroad
manner that impermissibly implicates individual liberty interests. 22 In
essence, only a societally-sanctioned revenge on the 'bad mother' is
achieved through a punishment-oriented system. 23
These negative
circumstances serve no substantial state, fetal or maternal interests, and the

Zimmerman, a Wisconsin woman who was prosecuted for drinking while pregnant). See
State v. Zimmerman, No. 96-CF-525, 1996 WL 858598 at *1 (Wis. Cir. Sept. 18, 1996)
(unpublished decision).
"Since 1985, at least 200 women in thirty states have been criminally prosecuted for
the use of illicit drugs or alcohol during pregnancy through a variety of tactics." Sarah
Letitia Kowalski, Looking for a Solution: Determining Fetal Status for Prenatal Drug
Abuse Prosecutions, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1255, 1255 (1998) (citing Philip H. Jos et.
aI., The Charleston Policy on Cocaine Use During Pregnancy: A Cautionary Tale, 23 J. L.
MED. & Enncs 120 (1995».
18. See THE CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE LAW AND POLICY, PUNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR
BEHAVIOR DURING PREGNANCY (Feb. 1996) [hereinafter PUNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR
BERAVI OR DURING PREGNANCY]. Estimates indicate that at least 200 women in more than
39 states have been arrested and criminally charged for actions taken during their
pregnancies. See LYNN M. PALTROW, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AGAINST PREGNANT
WOMEN: NATIONAL UPDATE AND OVERVIEW (1992). See also Whitner v. South Carolina,
492 S.E.2d 777 (1997); Zimmerman, 1996 WL 858598, at *1. In Grand Isle, Louisiana,
police arrested Lori Ingram for negligent homicide after the medical examiner "concluded
there was 'strong likelihood' that alcohol and drugs caused her baby to be stillborn."
Cocaine Law Targets Pregnant Black Women, OAKLAND POST, June 14, 1998, at 1. District
Attorney Paul Connick Jr. is considering prosecuting Ingram for abusing alcohol while
pregnant. Id.
19. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. See REGULATING WOMANHOOD 31 (Carol Smart ed., 1992). "The construction of
women's bodies as unruly and as a continual source of potential disruption to the social
order has given rise to more and more sophisticated and flexible mechanisms for imposing
restraint and achieving desired docility." Id.
21. See id. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under
Law, 100 YALEL.J. 1281 (1991).
22. See Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76
B.U. L. REv. 113, 116 (1996). See also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
8 (1995).
23. See DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 12.

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

294

[Vol. 10:2

problem continues.
After a brief overview of the current effects of FAS and FAE in
Minnesota, and in the United States generally, and the FAS Task Force's
corresponding response, this paper will propose a value system for
evaluating the problem of alcohol use and abuse during pregnancy. These
values are collectively characterized as the Mutual Responsibility
Approach (Mutual Responsibility Approach, Mutual Responsibility or
approach). This system recognizes a unique symbiotic relationship
between a pregnant woman and the state. In essence, if the state expects a
woman to fulfill her maternal duty by not drinking or otherwise harming
her fetus, then a woman may validly expect the state to help her achieve
this goal through means that respect her individual civil rights, personal
values and human dignity. Under the Mutual Responsibility Approach
maternal duty is reaffirmed as a positive, individual experience that cannot
be defined strictly by the state. Maternal duty can be recognized and
encouraged legislatively under a system based on morality, but this
morality cannot be monolithic in its definition. Pregnant women who drink
have suspended their maternal duty but they are not without principles;
these women still have the ability to meet their moral obligations but need
assistance to do so. If the state does not respond to the needs of these
women through education and treatment opportunities, the state itself is
without morality.
The ideas encompassed by the Mutual Responsibility Approach favor
inclusive problem-solving, which means a cooperative relationship
between the pregnant woman and the state. Social responsibility is
preferred over individual castigation. Primarily, the Mutual Responsibility
Approach deconstructs the maternal-fetal conflict and reconfigures
maternal duty as an individually-defined concept. This result recognizes
that a woman has obligations to the health of her fetus, but these duties do
not diminish her own identity or confer a greater societal duty. The Mutual
Responsibility Approach recognizes that a woman's environment-positive
or negative-influences her relationship with the fetus. The Mutual
Responsibility Approach also avoids blanket subjective assessments of
maternal morality in the legal and social contexts. Universal morality
systems are fundamentally unfair; communities of color, for example, are
already harmed by a race-biased system of mandatory reporting,24 and
therefore any value system must incorporate a philosophy that respects
different solutions to the same problem. Mutual Responsibility also
considers the constitutional clash between fetal and sex equality rights, and
takes the position that FASIFAE cannot be 'ghettoized' as a woman's
problem.
Finally, the Mutual Responsibility Approach will be contrasted with
24. See Keyes, supra note 13.
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punitive and coercive tactics such as mandatory reporting, civil
commitment and prosecution. The approach described herein rigorously
advocates the characterization of alcoholism as a disease requiring
treatment through increased rehabilitation opportunities-a stance taken by
the FAS Task Force recommendations.
In addition, the Mutual
Responsibility Approach includes the added options of treatment on
demand, community education, incentive programs and self-driven,
nonjudgmental support opportunities that preserve a woman's individual
rights while at the same time addressing a critical social problem. Overall,
the values embodied by the Mutual Responsibility Approach emanate from
the perspective that the state has an obligation to assist pregnant women in
overcoming their use and abuse of alcohol.

II. FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME AND FETAL ALCOHOL
EFFECT IN MINNESOTA AND THE UNITED STATES: THE
FAS TASK FORCE RESPONSE
A)

ORIGIN, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND SYMPTOMS

FAS was formally named in 1973, but the dangerous link between
alcohol and pregnancy had been suspected for some time. 25 Although a
link between alcohol and pregnancy was suspected, FAS was rarely studied
or taken seriously until recently. Many doctors during the 1950s and 1960s
attributed possible alcohol-related disorders to poor home environment. 26
Alcohol was often prescribed to pregnant patients as a means of
relaxation?7 However, attitudes changed considerably by 1981 when the
Surgeon General recommended that pregnant women and women
considering pregnancy should avoid consumption of alcoholic beverages. 28
Despite warnings from medical experts, instances of FAS and FAE
continue to occur. Recent studies indicate that 0.5 to 3 cases of FAS occur
per 1,000 births, which translates into a range of 2,000 to 12,000 births in

25. See MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHIMARCH OF DIMES FACT SHEET, ALcOHOL
USE DURING PREGNANCY [hereinafter DOH/MOD Fact Sheet]. However, consider this
quote from biblical times: "Behold thou shalt conceive and bear a son: now drink no wine or
strong drink" (Judges 13:7) quoted in SHIRLEY N. SPARKS, CHILDREN OF PRENATAL
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 78 (1993). "There was a strong suspicion of a link between alcohol and
birth defects in the 18th century and scientific evidence of the relationship was gradually
produced during the 19th and 20th centuries." Claire E. Dineen, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome:
The Legal and Social Responses to Its Impact on Native Americans, 70 N.D. L. REv. 1, 3
(1994) (citations omitted).
26. See SPARKS, supra note 25, at 78. "Poor home environment" was determined through
both objective clinical and subjective moralistic evaluations. Id.
27. See id.; Interview with Deborah Thorp, M.D., supra note 8. "It's amazing to me that
20 years ago when I was a lab technician before I went to med school we used
[intravenously administered] alcohol to stop preterm labor. We were intentionally giving
women 1.5 or 1.2 blood alcohol levels to stop the labor." Id.
28. See SPARKS, supra note 25, at 78.
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29
the United States each year.
FAE may affect 36,000 newborns
annually.30 In Minnesota, it is estimated that as many as 900 children are
born with FAS or FAE per year. 31 The state is currently home to some
16,000 F AS and F AE youth under the age of 21 who represent a crosssection of cultures, races and socio-economic groups. 32 Further, some
27,000 babies born in Minnesota each year have had at least a small
amount of prenatal alcohol exposure during their mother's pregnancy. 33
The effects of alcohol on a fetus are immediate and severe. Alcohol, a
teratogen, affects the fetus within as little as fifteen minutes after the
mother ingests a drink. 34 The fetus will assume the same blood alcohol
content as the mother but it will not metabolize and eliminate the alcohol as
quickly. 35 This combination of factors makes FAS and its related effects
the leading cause of preventable mental retardation in both Minnesota and
the United States,36 yet FAS remains among the most under-diagnosed of
37
childhood disorders. There are no specific lab tests for determining the
presence of FAS or F AE. Instead, diagnosis of these conditions depends
entirely on clinical judgment and reliance on "minimal criteria" set by the
Fetal Alcohol Study Group.38
FAS and F AE create permanent physical and mental conditions. These
terms do not, as commonly misunderstood, simply describe a "drunk baby"
29. FAS, Executive Summary: Diagnosis, Epidemiology, Prevention and Treatment
(Kathleen Stratton et al. eds., National Academy Press, Division of Biobehavioral Sciences
and Mental Disorders) [hereinafter Executive Summary] (visited Mar. 1, 1998)
<http://www.nap.edulreadingroomlbooks/fetallindex.htm1> .
30. SANTA BARBARA ALcOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAM, PETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME
NCAAD FACT SHEET [hereinafter SBADP Fact Sheet] (visited Mar. 1, 1998)
<http://www.silcom.coml-sbadp/effects/fas.htm>.
31. See DOHIMOD Fact Sheet, supra note 25; FASIFAE Task Force Public Hearing,
Crookston, MN, Oct. 8, 1997 [hereinafter Crookston Task Force Hearing] (statement by
Polk County attorney). See also SUfFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 10. "A previous
report has put the number of Minnesota babies born with fetal alcohol syndrome and effects
at 268 to 804 out of about 67,000 total in 1993 .... Various reports say fetal alcohol effects
could be two to 10 times higher than fetal alcohol syndrome.")
32. See Memorandum to FAS Task Force from First Lady Susan Carlson (Aug. 21,
1997).
33. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 10. One report estimates that 41 percent
of women between the ages of 18 and 40 drank at least once while pregnant. !d.
34. See Dineen, supra note 25, at 18. A teratogen is "an agent or factor causing
malformation of an embryo." THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 1259 (8th ed. 1990).
35. See Dineen, supra note 25, at 18.
36. See id. at 3. See also The National Organization on Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (visited
Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.nofas.orglwhat.htm>. "In 1991, the Journal of the American
Medical Association reported that FAS is the leading known cause of mental retardation."
[d. FAS surpasses both Spina Bifida and Down's Syndrome in occurrence rates. [d.
37. See NOFAS Fact Sheet, supra note 2. "Some experts believe between one third and
two-thirds of all children in special education have been affected by alcohol in some way."
[d. "A 100% misdiagnosis rate was reported in a Houston hospital study of 48 newborns
known to have alcoholic mothers. By age one, six of the infants had significant signs of
F AS but none had been diagnosed at birth." [d.
38. SPARKS, supra note 25, at 79. See also Dineen, supra note 25, at 7.
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or an infant born addicted to alcohol. 39 Children exhibiting F AS have
several prominent characteristics: abnormal facial features (small eyes, flat
mid-face or thin upper lip), stunted or irregular physical growth, malformed
internal organs and brain damage contributing to intellectual and emotional
development delays.40 FAE children, on the other hand, share many of the
same developmental symptoms as their FAS counterparts except for the
telltale physical characteristics, making accurate diagnosis even more
difficult for parents and medical or social professionals. 41 FASIFAE
children (and affected adults) often have difficulty structuring time, are
slow learners, suffer from poor memory, act on impulse, show inferior
judgment, experience heightened sensory awareness, are fearless to the
point of being dangerous to themselves and others, cannot handle money
42 Thus,
responsibly and verbalize better than they understand language.
maternal alcohol consumption presents a host of dangers to a fetus that
seem to surpass those presented by the use of other legal and illegal
43
In
substances, including marijuana, cocaine, heroin and tobacco.
addition, FAS and FAE problems tend to last into adulthood, while some
cocaine and heroin related developmental damage tends to dissipate over
39. See generally Executive Summary, supra note 29. See also SUFFER THE CHILDREN,
supra note 2, at 8.
40. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 8. See also Executive Summary, supra
note 29.
41. See generally DR. LYDIA CAROS, MEDICAL DIRECTOR, INDIAN HEALTH BOARD OF
MINNEAPOLIS, UNDERSTANDING FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME-THE BASICS. See also
SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 8-9.
42. See Patricia Tanner-Halverson, Ph.D., Strategies for Parents and Caregivers of FAS
and
FAE
Children
[hereinafter
Strategies]
(visited
Mar.
1,
1998),
<http://www.nofas.org/strategy.htm>. A parent/foster parent stated that it is important to
"[s]ee FASIE children as lovable with unbearable problems. They do not have good
reasoning skills, are quick to anger, and have low self-esteem, resulting in problems at
school. The emotional drain on parents is overwhelming." Crookston Task Force Hearing,
supra note 31. A Supervisor at Family and Children's Services stated,
I have a 27-year-old adopted daughter whose parents were both severe
alcoholics. Last May she'd been drinking a lot, came to railroad tracks and
didn't want to wait for the train to pass, so she crawled under it, and lost
both legs. This is one of the consequences of her poor decision-making
ability. Now she's adjusting to the loss but continues to make poor
decisions.
FASIFAE Task Force Public Hearing, Grand Rapids, MN, Oct. 23, 1997.
43. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 7. Alcohol consumption during
pregnancy contributes to low birth weight, impaired growth, facial malformation, small head
size, intellectual and developmental delays, hyperactivity/inattention, sleeping problems,
poor feeding, excessive crying, organ damage, birth defects and respiratory problems.
Marijuana use leads to intellectual and developmental delays, hyperactivity/inattention,
sleeping problems and excessive crying. Cocaine use contributes to low birthweight,
sleeping problems, poor feeding, and excessive crying. Heroin use engenders low
birthweight, hyperactivity/inattention, sleeping problems, poor feeding, excessive crying,
higher risk for Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) and respiratory problems. Finally,
tobacco use leads to low birthweight, hyperactivity/inattention, higher risk for SIDS and
respiratory problems. See id.
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44

time.
To effectively respond to these problems, caregivers need to provide a
predictable and positive yet disciplined environment for children with
F ASIFAE. A lack of internal structure must be counterbalanced by a
consistent (to the point of repetitive), stimulating (but only to a certain
45
experiential point), and vigilant external structure.
However, even with
constant attention many F ASIFAE children encounter what are defined as
46
"secondary disabilities," especially as they grow older.
Secondary
disabilities include attention deficit disorder, inappropriate sexual behavior,
substance abuse, legal troubles, unemployment, and overall dependence on
47
others in order to meet daily needs.
Individuals with FASIFAE are
trusting, often to the point of naivete and therefore are extremely
48
vulnerable to exploitation by others.
Despite this extensive list of
perceived and potential problems, many affected children are not always
eligible for special education because they often score in the normal range
49
on IQ tests. This is unfortunate because symptoms tend to grow worse
5o
without timely identification and professional assistance.
B)

THE DEMOGRAPHY OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND ALCOHOL
CONSUMPTION

Predicting the onset of F AS and F AE is impossible because little is
known about the relationship of alcohol consumption and vulnerable
phases of fetal development. In light of this uncertainty, the majority of
medical experts operate under the assumption that any alcohol intake
51
during pregnancy is categorically unsafe.
Nonetheless, drinking during
pregnancy appears to be on the rise in the United States after a brief decline
52
during the mid-to-Iate 1980s.
This increase is despite the fact that by
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 9.
47. See id.
48. See Strategies, supra note 42.
49. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 6. In a sample of 473 clients (178 with
FAS and 295 with FAE) the range of IQ for FAS clients was 29 to 120, with a mean IQ of
79; range of IQ for clients with FAE was from 42 to 142, with a mean IQ of 90. See
Secondary Disabilities in FAS and FAE, Notes from Conference in Seattle, Sept. 1996
(compiled by Teresa Kellerman, PCDD) (on file with author).
50. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 4.
51. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 11; DOHIMOD Fact Sheet, supra note
25; Executive Summary, supra note 29; SBADP Fact Sheet, supra note 30; NOFAS Fact
Sheet, supra note 2.
52. See Nancy L. Day & Gale A. Richardson, Comparative Tetrogenicity of Alcohol and

Other Drugs: Prenatal Exposure to Alcohol or Other Drugs Can Impair Physical,
Intellectual and Behavioral Development, 18 ALcOHOL HEALTH & REs. WORLD 42 (1994).
There was a decline from
32 percent to 20 percent in the overall rate of alcohol use during pregnancy
over a three-year-period from 1985-88. Nevertheless, in this random
population-based study of 38,224 women, 1,712 of whom were pregnant, 25
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1990, a majority of women believed that ingesting excessive amounts of
alcohol while pregnant was potentially harmful to the fetus. 53 Between
1991 and 1995 more women than ever were drinking during pregnancy,
and in greater amounts, even though many alcoholic beverage containers
carried warning labels. 54 Some researchers attribute this fact to recent
reports about the health benefits of moderate drinking and a growing
misperception that "binge drinking" is not a problem. 55 Some studies
estimate that three times as many women drink during pregnancy than use
illegal drugs. 56 Other studies have concluded that women are sixteen times
more likely to use alcohol instead of cocaine during pregnancy. 57
Knowledge about FASIFAE varies regionally as well as across
different age, racial, and income groupS.58 Minnesota ranks as the fourth
percent of the pregnant women reported they had drunk an alcoholic
beverage in the past month.

Id.
A recent study conducted by the Centers for Disease Control concluded that,
[i]n 1995, four times as many pregnant women said they frequently
consumed alcohol as in 1991. Frequent drinking is defined as having at least
seven drinks in one week or at least five on one occasion. The number of
pregnant women consuming any amount of alcohol rose, as well, increasing
more than 60 percent between mid-1992 and 1995 ....
More Pregnant Women are Drinking, CDC Says; Switch in Trend Raises Concerns About
an Increase in Fetal Alcohol Syndrome], STAR'TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 12, 1998, at 3E
[hereinafter More Pregnant Women are Drinking].
53. See Mary C. Dufour et al., Knowledge of FAS and the Risks of Heavy Drinking
During Pregnancy, 1985, 18 ALcOHOL HEALTH & REs. WORLD 86 (1994). The majority of
women, which numbered from 89 to 92 percent, believed that "heavy drinking during
pregnancy definitely or probably increases the chance of miscarriage, mental retardation,
low birth weight, and birth defects." Id.
54. See More Pregnant Women are Drinking, supra note 51. See also Mother's Vices
During Pregnancy; Drinking on Rise Despite Risks to Fetus, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
Feb. 16, 1998, at IE. "A recent survey for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) in Atlanta reports that more pregnant women ages 18 to 44 drank alcohol in 1995
than 1991. And larger numbers of them consumed seven or more drinks per week." Id. In
a telephone survey of 33,585 women, the CDC discovered that 3.5 percent of them drank
frequently during pregnancy in 1995 as compared to .8 percent in 1991. This data indicates
that at least 140,000 pregnant women are drinking at levels that pose a risk for FAS. See
Field Voices Alarm Over Rise in Drinking During Pregnancy, 9 ALcOHOLISM & DRUG
ABUSE WKLY. 3 (1997). Overall, the CDC has reported a "six-fold increase in the
percentage of babies born with F AS over the past fifteen years. Since the Centers began
tracking FAS, the rate has increased from one case per 10,000 live births in 1979 to 6.7
cases per 10,000 live births in 1993." NOFAS Fact Sheet, supra note 2. Research has
shown that defects may result from ingestion of seven or less drinks per week. See Dineen,
supra note 25, at 20 (citations omitted). Severe neurobehavioral problems result from
consuming 14-28 drinks per week. Id.
55. See id.
56. See NOFAS Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
57. See, e.g., SPARKS, supra note 25, at 82 (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE,
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: MAIN FINDING 1990, (1991)).
58. See Dufour et al., supra note 53, at 86. "Black women, Hispanic women and women
with family incomes of less than $20,000 per year were less likely than all women combined
to have heard of FAS. On the other hand, women ages 30 to 44 years, living in the
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highest state in the nation for drinking by women of childbearing age. 59 In
Minnesota, women under the age of 35 are the most likely to report alcohol
Recent statewide studies have found that
dependency problems. 60
61
excessive drinking can be traced to teenage girls as well. These trends
indicate that information about prenatal alcohol use and its long-term
effects is not reaching a significant portion of the population. 62 On a
national level, surveys show that many health care practitioners still do not
discuss the subject of alcohol and drug use with their pregnant patients. 63
Statistics on alcohol use and abuse among pregnant women vary
according to social classes and racial groups. Women in low-income
communities tend to have their alcohol or drug use reported on a more
frequent basis than women in middle- or upper-class communities because
they must rely on public health care. 64 Private physicians treating middleand upper-class women are less likely to utilize testing or to question
Midwest, and with more than 12 years of education were more likely to have heard of FAS
than were all women combined." Id.
59. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 10. This statistic is based on the 1995
CDC survey which found that nearly 18 percent of Minnesota women age 18 to 44 said they
"drank alcohol frequently" in the previous month, a rate the CDC defines as "more than 30
drinks in one month or five or more drinks at anyone time." Id. The national median is
11.5 percent. See DOHIMOD Fact Sheet, supra note 25.
60. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 11. 85 percent of all pregnancies in
Minnesota occur between the ages of 20 and 34. Id.
61. See id. According to a 1995 school survey, "in the month preceding 17 percent of the
ninth-grade girls and 35 percent of the girls in 12th grade consumed four or more drinks at
one time." Id.
62. See FASIFAE Task Force Public Hearing, Anoka, MN, Oct. 13, 1997. A women's
health instructor at North Hennepin Community College stated that "There is still a lot of
misinformation about F AS, prenatal alcohol use, and alcoholism in general, particularly
about the long-term effects." !d. A county welfare worker noted that "[c]ulturally, we have
an established norm that drinking and smoking are ways to have fun quick." FASIFAE
Task Force Public Hearing, Duluth, MN, Oct. 23, 1997 [hereinafter Deluth Task Force
Hearing].
63. See NOFAS Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
A federally funded study in four U.S. Southern communities found that only
65 percent of women were asked by a physician or nurse about alcohol or
drug use during their most recent pregnancy. Further, although most of the
women who were asked acknowledged substance abuse, only three percent
were referred to treatment.
NOFAS Fact Sheet, supra note 2 (quoting Shelly Geshan, Southern Regional Project on
Infant Mortality, 1993).
A national panel convened by the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation found that
most doctors do not even try to identify problems by asking patients
questions about alcohol and drug habits, and do not know how to respond if
they do find evidence of dependency. The panel called for an increase in
mandatory training on substance abuse for medical residents as the first step
toward improving treatment.
Susan Gilbert, Doctors Found to Fail in Diagnosing Addictions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996,
at C8, quoted in NOFAS Fact Sheet, supra note 2. "If the obstetricians are drinking, we're a
little bit hard-pressed to be telling our patients not to have any ... there's a credibility gap."
Interview with Deborah Thorp, M.D., supra note 8.
64. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 1432-33.
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behavior based on the unfounded assumption that these women do not
drink during pregnancy.65 A frequently quoted study undertaken during the
late 1980' s indicated that doctors reported African American women at a
rate ten times that of Caucasian women, and poor women were more likely
than others to be reported. 66
Native American communities show the highest FAS and FAE
numbers in the country.67 The incidence rate overall is thirty-three times
higher than among Caucasians. These numbers vary greatly from tribe to
tribe and regionally, with the southwestern United States showing the
greatest number of cases.68 In Minnesota, FAS and FAE has become so
pervasive that one Upper Sioux community member recently stated that
"some Indian parents thought their children had Indian features, but they
were [actually] FAS features.,,69
c)

COSTS

Annual national estimates for treatment, special education, foster care,
correctional and other administrative costs relating to FAS and FAE
populations range from $75 million to $9.7 billion, depending on the
recency and specificity of the particular study. 70 In Minnesota, costs
directly and indirectly related to the incidence of FAS and FAE continue to
rise. The FAS Task Force acknowledges this fact as one of the motivating
factors for implementing a comprehensive state-regulated legal, social and
71
medical system to address the problem. During the 1995-96 school year
alone the state spent nearly $700 million in special education services for
101,000 children; approximately $59 million is spent annually to
incarcerate delinquent youth and $160,000 million goes toward
incarcerating adults; $164 million per year is allocated to out-of-home
placements for 17,500 children; chemical dependency treatment programs
added up to $40 million in 1996; and the cost of services for people with
mental retardation totaled $478 million in 1996.72 In an extreme case,
65. See id.
66. See Ira J. Chasnoff, M.D., et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use
During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida,
322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202 (1990).
67. See SPARKS, supra note 25, at 82 (citing R.E. Little & J.K. Wendt, The Effects of
Maternal Drinking in the Reproductive Period: An Epidemiologic Review, 3 J. SUBSTANCE
ABUSE 187, 187-204 (1991)).
68. See Dineen, supra note 25, at 12-13.
69. FASIFAE Task Force Public Hearing, Willmar, MN, Oct. 15, 1997.
70. See Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: Diagnosis, Epidemiology, Prevention and Treatment,
Institute of Medicine (1996) quoted in NOFAS Fact Sheet, supra note 2. Under a
conservative estimate of one FAS newborn per every 1,000 live births in 1980, "it cost
approximately $14.8 million to treat them~ $670 million to treat the 68,000 FAS children
under 18; and $760 million to treat 160,000 FAS adults. Plus, indirect productivity losses
were $510.5 million." SBADP Fact Sheet, supra note 29.
71. See Carlson, supra note 4, at 19A.
72. See SUFFER THE CmLDREN, supra note 2, at 11.
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officials in one county estimate they will spend over $2 million dollars on
the needs of a single family.73
D)

SELECTED FAS TASK FORCE RESPONSES

The F AS Task Force began its list of recommendations with the
premise that low public awareness is an impediment to prevention efforts. 74
Statistics indicating rising incidences of drinking during pregnancy suggest
that minimal and arbitrary educational efforts have had little success in
changing habits within communities. 75 Thus, any statewide campaign that
undertakes raising community consciousness of F AS and its related
disorders needs to be ongoing, positive, multi-cultural, age-differentiated
and highly visible. 76 Additionally, toll-free help lines and other serviceoriented resources should be provided. 77 Public awareness actions should
occur in connection with more visible warnings in alcohol advertising as
well as ordinances regulating placement of alcohol-related billboards in
certain communities. 78 Aggressive social marketing requires solid data.
The Task Force recognized that studies and surveys have provided at best
an unfocused picture of F ASIFAE impact in the state. 79
The Task Force found that more action needs to be taken to "identify,
warn and help women who are likely to drink during pregnancy. ,,80 It
recommended a program of systematically screening and identifying for

73. See id. at 3. "Six of twelve children in one family in our county were diagnosed with
fetal alcohol syndrome. All of the children, ranging in age from four to twenty-three, have
been placed in foster care for periods ranging up to a dozen years. None has graduated from
high school and three of the daughters have or are expecting children; one new baby is now
in foster care. Excluding medical care, the county has spent about $800,000 for foster care,
mental health and social services, day treatment, specialized care and more. Another $1.3
million will probably be needed to care for family members still under age 18." [d. at 5.
74. See id. at 12. Note that much of this section concerns recommendations, not planned
actions as of yet. S.F. No. 3346, 80th Leg., 3d Engrossment (Minn. 1998). 3346 provides
certain fund appropriations for some of the programs and ideas discussed; other
recommendations may be undertaken at a later date with further appropriations. The $5
million appropriation will support the following:
(1) $850,000 to administer community grants for fetal alcohol syndrome
prevention and intervention as defined in Minnesota Statutes, section
145.9266, subdivision 4;
(2) $800,000 to expand maternal and child service programs under
Minnesota Statutes, section 254.17, subdivision 1;
(3) $850,000 to expand treatment services and halfway houses for pregnant
women and women with children; and
(4) $800,000 to develop and implement a public awareness campaign.
S.F. No. 3346, 80th Leg., 3d Engrossment (Minn. 1998).
75. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 8-11.
76. See id. at 12.
77. See id. at 13.
78. See id.
79. [d.
80. [d. at 14.
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treatment pregnant women who use or abuse alcohol.8l Screening will
operate in conjunction with further training of health care professionals to
counsel their patients about the dangers of using alcohol and drugs during
pregnancy.82 The Task Force also addressed the problem of late or wrong
diagnosis in relation to FAS and FAE by supporting the creation of a
statewide diagnostic clinic network. 83 Finally, the Task Force made several
recommendations concerning the expansion of services to children affected
by FAS and its related disorders. However, these childhood diagnosis and
service subject areas are outside the scope of this paper.

III. CONSTRUCTING A MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY
APPROACH FOR DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF ALCOHOL USE
AND ABUSE DURING PREGNANCY
A)

ESTABLISHING A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
MOTHER, THE FETUS AND THE STATE: DECONSTRUCTING THE
MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICT AND RECONSIDERING MATERNAL DUTY

Traditionally, human society cannot tolerate a "bad mother." From
mythology and history to the headline news, mothers who harm their
children, intentionally or not, are considered beyond redemption. 84 It is
often difficult to separate the women who act out of true cruelty or
81. Id. The controversial mandatory reporting immunity for medical professionals and
Civil Commitment Act expansion is contained within this recommendation. See id. at 15.
See also sources cited supra notes 5 and 11.
82. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 15.
83. See id. at 17. Such a statewide diagnostic network would be run by the University of
Minnesota, the Mayo Clinic and the Minnesota Children with Special Health Needs
program at the Department of Health. See id.
84. See, e.g., EURIPEDES, MEDEA: MYTH AND DRAMATIC FORM (James L. Sanderson &
Everett Zimmerman eds., 1st ed. 1967). Medea was a sorceress who was skilled in the use
of drugs and poisons. She married Jason of the Argonauts and helped him procure the
prized Golden Fleece. When Jason left Medea and their children (as many as seven,
depending on the version of the story) to marry Glauce (or Creusa), Medea flew into a
jealous rage. See id. at 3-7. In Euripedes' version of the myth, Medea kills their two
children as revenge for Jason's infidelity. See id. at 14. When Jason discovers Medea's
crime he says the following: "You abomination! Of all women most detestedlBy every god,
by me, by the whole human race!lYou could endure-a mother!-to lift sword againstIYour
own little ones .... " Id. at 48 (lines 1201-1204).
Scottish-Irish and Japanese folk tales tell of women bringing their children "to the
water's edge for both protection and destruction," imagery that summons the 1996 news
story of Susan Smith who strapped her two young sons into the family car and then released
the brakes, allowing the automobile to plunge into a lake, thereby drowning the helpless
boys. Myra Yellin Outwater, Susan Smith Case Inspires Play on Dark Side of Motherhood,
MORNING CALL, Jan. 30, 1998, at D12.
The wicked stepmother is a common theme in many folk and fairy tales. Bruno
Bettelheim wrote in The Uses of Enchantment that "the idea of an angry, vengeful mother is
so frightening to children that our fairy stories have bifurcated the maternal role. The cruel
stepmother is a manifestation of her purely negative side, the fairy godmother her purely
benevolent role." Adrian Mourby, All About Evil: Why Can't Society Accept That Women
Can Be Bad Mothers?, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Feb. 13,1997, at T4.
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depravity from those who, tragically overwhelmed by internal or external
demands, cannot cope with their roles as protector and nurturer. 85
Nonetheless, all are similarly ostracized by communities bent on revenge
for the loss of unqualifiedly innocent lives. Without a doubt the wrongs
that certain mothers have visited upon their children are abhorrent. But
when the intended or unintended target of a mother's actions becomes the
fetus, the moral territory-the literal battleground of Roe v. Wade
viability86-becomes much more rugged and uncertain. It is against this
volatile backdrop that a discussion of values governing a mother's role in
preventing F AS and its related disorders occurs.
1)

Defining the Undefinable: What is Personhood?

No discussion of fetal rights is apolitical because much of the
theoretical context is influenced by point-of-viability debates originating in
the abortion-rights controversy.87 The notion of viability was formalized
by Roe v. Wade, the landmark 1973 case describing the point of gestation at
which a state may legally proscribe a woman's right to abortion. 88
According to Roe, a woman may opt for abortion with the advice of her
physician during the first three months of pregnancy; the state regulates,
but cannot expressly limit, a woman's right to choose an abortion during
the second three-month period. 89 Abortions after the twenty-fourth week,
when the fetus is deemed capable of living outside the womb, are permitted
only as a means of preserving the life and health of the mother. 90
Most important to this discussion, the Supreme Court in Roe held that a
viable fetus is not a person, and thus cannot receive protection under the
91
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also determined that the decision to
85. See sources cited supra note 84 and accompanying text.
86. 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). The Supreme Court held in Roe that the state may assert a
compelling interest over the health, safety and well-being of a fetus at the point of viability,
approximately 24 weeks into the pregnancy, when the fetus is capable of living outside of
the mother's womb. See id. at 163. See also Page McGuire Linden, Drug Addiction During
Pregnancy: A Call for Increased Social Responsibility, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 105, 11113 (1995).
87. See MacKinnon, supra note 21, at 1317.
88. 410 U.S. at 163-4.
89. Id. at 163.
90. See id. at 160.
91. Id. at 158.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Citing several references to the word "person" in the Constitution, the Court
concluded that "in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has
application only postnatally." Roe, 410 U.S. at 157. "None indicates, with any assurance,
that it has any possible prenatal application.". /d. The Court also noted that during the
nineteenth century, abortion practices were "freer," further evidence that the Fourteenth
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terminate a pregnancy is included within the fundamental constitutional
right of privacy.92 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the second important
abortion decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the central holding of Roe,
but rejected the trimester framework in favor of an undue burden analysis
93
to determine the state's interest in the potential for life. The focus on the
point of viability, however, remained consistent with Roe. 94
2)

Personhood in Minnesota

A Minnesota statute defines viability as the ability "to live outside the
womb even though artificial aid may be required.,,95 The language at one
time included the term "potentially viable" but this was declared
"unreasonable and unconstitutional because it provided, at least in terms of
abortion legislation, that the fetus could be considered potentially viable at
the end of the twentieth week rather than the twenty-fourth week which
contravened the holding in Roe.,,96 Minnesota also follows the "born alive"
rule, as exemplified by its vehicular homicide statutes, which holds that a
state cannot prosecute a homicide unless a "person having an independent
97
and separate existence from the mother" has been killed. In addition, the
state maintains feticide laws that punish a third party for harming an
embryo or nonviable fetus. 98 An assailant who destroys an embryo or
nonviable fetus interferes with a woman's right to choose termination or
birth under Roe and its progeny. 99 Thus, the state's interest in protecting

Amendment (adopted in 1868) did not contemplate the inclusion of the unborn in the term
"person." Id. at 158.
92. See id. at 153. The right to privacy is considered broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy but this right is not absolute. See id. at 154.
For example, the state's "important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother"
occurs at the end of the first trimester, at which time the state may regulate the abortion
procedure.ld. at 163. The Court disagreed that a fetus is a "person" for the purposes of due
process analysis. Id. at 157.
93. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 u.S. 833, 878
(1992).
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with
this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the
interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free
choice, not hinder it.
Id. at 877.
94. Id. at 860.
95. MINN. STAT. § 145.411(2) (1996).
96. Id. (explaining Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976)).
97. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn. 1985). In Soto, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the term "human being" as used in vehicular homicide statutes did not
include a viable, eight-and-a-half-month old fetus capable of sustained life outside the
mother. Id. To conclude otherwise, said the Court, would represent a substantial change in
the criminal law that is within the sole province of the state legislature, not the judiciary. Id.
98. See State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990).
99. See id. at 321-22. The state can therefore prosecute an assailant who causes the death
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the potential for human life includes protection of the unborn through
feticide laws. However, a simultaneous interest exists in a woman's right
to decide the fate of her embryo or fetus until the point of viability.lOO
Needless to say, Minnesota's vehicular homicide and feticide decisions
exemplify a poignant contradiction: personhood is defined as post-birth in
some cases, but it is implied as pre-viability in others (meaning that a fetus
is deemed "person" enough to be protected under criminal statutes). 101
This is a clear example of careless lawmaking. 102
3)

Personhood Under the Mutual Responsibility Approach

The Mutual Responsibility Approach advocates the use of the Roe
definition of personhood and the 'born alive' characterization. 103 Further,
the approach argues in favor of a uniform characterization of personhood in
all areas of the law. 104 Personhood is simply not the type of legal concept
that can be adjusted depending on the unique circumstances of a case.
When courts and state legislatures continually redefine the meaning of
personhood, the general public becomes confused and begins to perceive of
the law as an arbitrary concept that serves only those with interests more
powerful than those of women who require treatment for substance abuse
during pregnancy.
Although it is significant that feticide laws in Minnesota and other

of a woman's fetus. See id.
100. MINN. STAT. § 626.5561 (1990). See also supra note 5.
101. See Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986).
By sometimes identifying the fetus rather than the woman as the locus of the
right when there is no live birth, recent laws have reflected a dangerous
conceptual move. The law no longer recognizes the fetus only in those cases
where it is necessary to protect the interests of the subsequently born child
and her or his parents. Rather, the law has conferred rights upon the fetus
qua fetus.
Conceptualizing the fetus as an entity with legal rights
independent of the pregnant woman has made possible the future creation of
fetal rights that could be used against the pregnant woman.
Id. at 603-04.
102. See id. at 609-11.
In thus treating the fetus, courts have glossed over crucial differences
between fetuses and persons, and have lost sight of the interests that narrow
legal recognition of the fetus traditionally has attempted to protect. They
have ignored alternatives to equating the fetus with a person that would have
more appropriately served their goals.
Id. at 610
103. See supra sections III(a)(1) and (2).
104. See MacKinnon, supra note 21, at 1315. "The fetus is not even like gendered body
parts. A fetus is lived by the pregnant woman through her pregnancy." Id. "Although the
Constitution does not prohibit first-trimester intervention in cases of gestational substance
abuse, public policy and logical consistency require the state to follow Roe's analysis and
refrain from intervening until after the first trimester." Kristen Rachelle Lichtenberg,
Gestational Substance Abuse: A Call for a Thoughtful Legislative Response, 65 WASH. L.
REv. 377, 388 (1990).
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states maintain the integrity of a woman's right to choose, it is nonetheless
troubling to see such a contradictory interpretation of 'life' present under
the law. When definitions are too flexible, room remains for legal
maneuvering that could lead to decisions adversely affecting a woman's
rights in relation to the fetus. This particular threat has not yet played out in
Minnesota, but as indicated by other situations discussed throughout this
paper, national trends suggest that every state should carefully weigh the
consequences of any action involving maternal and fetal rights, lest the
proper balance of interests be compromised.
The focus of the law during the pre-viability stage of fetal development
needs to remain on the woman and her needs. The question is at what
point, if ever, should a pregnant woman be penalized for her potentially
harmful behavior? The Mutual Responsibility Approach asserts that
automatic retribution is not productive in creating long-term individual or
societal change. The law must take the position that, if a woman is
incapable of meeting her maternal calling, then it is incumbent upon the
state to recognize its own moral duty by providing accessible treatment and
educational opportunities that do not focus on criminalizing behavior. If a
pregnant woman does not respond to treatment or education, then the state
may take further measures (i.e. civil commitment) to ensure both her own
safety and that of the fetus. However, such extreme action should remain
as a last resort option. The Mutual Responsibility approach seeks to
resolve the maternal-fetal conflict by placing the interests of the pregnant
woman first during the pre-viability stage, and then equalizing the fetal and
individual interests post-viability.105
4)

Resolving the Maternal-Fetal Conflict and Recontextualizing
Maternal Duty

Poetically speaking, the source of a woman's 'power' is her ability to
create a new life. However, realistically, a woman's reproductive capacity
at this time of increasing maternal-fetal conflict seems to signal the end of
her identity in the eyes of the state. 106 The fetus and mother are not
recognized as sharing interests-in fact, they assume adversarial roles. The
fetus is to be protected from the mother, who becomes a depersonalized
entity subordinated by her temporary status as a pregnant woman. 107
105. See MacKinnon, supra note 21, at 1315.
106. See PATRICIA SPALLONE, BEYOND CONCEPTION: THE NEW POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION
18 (1989). Spallone's book concerns the relationship of women to burgeoning in vitro
fertilization medical technology, but many of her discussions regarding women's modem
reproductive identity apply to the discussion within this paper.
107. See MacKinnon, supra note 21, at 1315-16. "Women's relation to the fetus is not
that of a powerful, fully capacitated being in relation to a powerless, incapacitated, and
incomplete one. Indeed, it shows how powerless women are that it takes a fetus to make a
woman look powerful by comparison." Id. at 1316-17. ''The pregnant woman is more than
a location for gestation. She is a woman, in the socially gendered and unequal sense of the
word ... the woman is not a mere vehicle for an event which happens to occur within her
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Further, as the notion of fetal rights has expanded with legal decisionmaking and advances in medical technology, women are increasingly
placed into an adversarial position with the developing fetus. 108 Amidst
this hostile context, the notion of maternal duty assumes a distinctly
negative edge.
Maternal duty under the Mutual Responsibility Approach is defined as
follows: to provide, to the best of a woman's individual ability, a healthy,
stable environment for both the mother and her fetus, and later the mother
and her child. Basic needs are met in this environment, and nurturing,
loving relationships flourish. Individual liberties and personal beliefs are
respected. Maternal duty is therefore an inherently private concept
although presumably, the majority of women share its basic premise. The
state has nothing to do with the meaning of maternal duty; instead this duty
encompasses the 'intertwined interests' of the woman and fetus. How the
woman chooses to accept her responsibility with regard to the fetus dictates
how the state will respect her through the eyes of the law. 109
When, due to internal or external factors, a woman cannot meet her
maternal duty, the state must provide her with the means by which she can
resume her duty, because it is in society's best interest to perpetuate-but
not dictate the parameters of-maternal duty. Maternal duty is not a
universal concept; rather, it is defined by personal and cultural influences.

physical boundaries for biological reasons." Id. at 1316.
108. See Sexton, supra note 8, at 414-16. Technology is not neutral. See SPALLONE, supra
note 106, at 186. "[D]octors can operate on fetuses in the womb and deliver them earlier."
Jan Crawford Greenburg, Roe vs. Wade at 25: America's Great Divide, Abortion-Right
Foes Alter Their Tactics, CHI. TRrn., Jan. 19, 1998, at 1. See also MacKinnon, supra note
21, at 1310.
Technology, also largely controlled by men, has made it possible to view the
fetus through ultrasound, fueling much of the present crisis in the legal status
of the fetus by framing it as a free-floating independent entity rather than as
connected with the pregnant woman.
Much of the authority and
persuasiveness of the ultrasound image derives from its presentation of the
fetus from the standpoint of the outside observer, the so-called objective
standpoint, so that it becomes socially experienced in these terms rather than
in terms of its direct connection to the woman. Presenting the fetus from
this point of view, rather than from that which is uniquely accessible to the
pregnant woman, stigmatizes her unique viewpoint as subjective and
internal. This has the epistemic effect of making the fetus more real than the
woman, who becomes reduced to the "grainy blur" at the edge of the image.
Id. at 1310-11.
109. See Kowalski, supra note 17, at 1262-63. Kowalski quotes Dawn Johnsen, who
advocates a "facilitative model" for defining the fetus-mother relationship. Id. at 1263.
This model "recognizes that women who bear children share the government's objective of
promoting healthy births but that ... [w ]omen inevitably must make numerous decisions
that require them to balance varying and uncertain risks to fetal development against
competing demands and interests in their lives." Id. at 1263 (citation omitted). Kowalski
also explores two other models where the "mother and fetus possess conflicting rights" and
where "the fetus has no rights until birth," id. at 1262, but settles on Johnsen's model as the
most realistic solution. Id. at 1290.
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If, and only if, a woman consistently cannot meet her maternal duty and
proves too great a danger to her viable fetus or child, then the state may
intervene with more extreme measures-but only after less restrictive
alternatives to the problem have been explored. Arbitrarily applied
punitive or coercive state strategies create a negative connotation for
maternal duty. In a liability-oriented environment, women who abuse
alcohol or other substances while pregnant are penalized without
opportunity to shape their own personal relationships to maternal duty or to
assume the course of treatment that will best facilitate a full and productive
recovery process.
A pregnant woman has individual rights to privacy, bodily integrity
and equal protection, but these rights conflict with impermeable negative
definitions of maternal dUty.110 This argument goes beyond individual
accountability. A woman is responsible for her actions, but when her
behavior arouses concern, the state has a moral duty to facilitate her
rehabilitation by means of non-coercive cooperative policies that recognize
the inherent struggles of pregnant women. III There is no fundamental right
to use alcohol or drugs during pregnancy; these actions endanger both the
fetus and the mother and implicate the state's interest in protecting both.
However, it is not possible for the state's "'management' of a woman's
pregnancy" and her legitimate fundamental rights to constitutionally
coexist. I 12 When a woman becomes pregnant, she does not suspend her
rights for nine months so that the state may assert its interest over her fetus,
and therefore over the woman herself. When a woman falters in fulfilling
her maternal duty (or if she never actively seeks it, as in the case of
impregnation by rape or a simple misuse of birth control), society needs to
provide her with the means for finding solutions that do not penalize or
coerce. A pregnant woman in need of help will not seek assistance when
there are strings attached; as long as there are, the maternal-fetal conflict
will persist, the state interest in healthy children and healthy mothers will
go unmet, and the notion of maternal duty will remain negative.

110. See Linden, supra note 86, at 111.
A maternal duty renders a woman the guarantor of the mental and physical
health of her fetus. Requiring a woman to conform to an objective standard
limits her right to conduct her life and pregnancy as she sees fit. Also,
imposing a duty may create an adversarial relationship between a woman
and her fetus: a woman might view her fetus as a potential opponent rather
than as a future child.
Lichtenberg, supra note 104, at 389.
111. See Linden, supra note 86, at 115.
112. Rachel H. Nicholson, No Pregnant Woman is an Island: The Case for a Carefully
Delimited Use of Criminal Sanctions to Enforce Gestational Responsibility, 1 HEALTH
MATRIX 101, 119 (1991), quoting John A. Robertson, who states "[fJull freedom in
procreation includes a woman's freedom to make the myriad decisions she faces in gestating
and giving birth to a child .... It is possible to distinguish 'management' of a woman's
pregnancy from the true right to freedom of procreation." Id. at 120.
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b) Reassessing Subjective and Objective Interpretations of Maternal
Morality: Environmentally and Culturally Sensitive Responses
Maternal morality remains a one-dimensional false construct. A
constant refrain in the movement toward laws penalizing pregnant women
who drink is that '''they' don't seem to care," but this is simply not the case
for the majority of pregnant women who drink.l13 Proponents of
alternatives to punitive and coercive measures recognize that most women
who drink while pregnant (or conduct any other activity potentially harmful
to the fetus) are not willfully harming the fetus; rather they have an
114
Their actions are not dispositive indicators of poor parenting
addiction.
ability.1l5 Environmental factors such as racism, domestic violence, sexual
abuse, unemployment, homelessness, poverty, discrimination based on
sexual orientation, substandard living conditions, a bad childhood, lack of
health insurance and the absence of geographically or culturally accessible
treatment and counseling opportunities all contribute to a cycle of isolation
for women of all classes and races. 1l6 Residual effects of alcoholism
include malnourishment, depression, poor self-image, self-destructive
tendencies, fear of failure, lack of access to educational and medical
resources, exposure to sexually transmitted diseases and chronic illness. 1l7
113. Interview with Deborah Thorp, M.D., supra note 8. "They all care on some level, but
it may be that the definition of how they care is not the same as how white middle-class
America defines it. They all have a burden about what they've used." [d.
The theory that pregnant women who abuse drugs [and alcohol] do not care
about their children has no merit. Most pregnant addicts want to do what is
best for their unborn child. However, pregnant addicts report that they feel
so guilty about using drugs during their pregnancy that they consume more
drugs in an attempt to alleviate self-loathing. Also, many pregnant addicts
are victimized by influences they have no control over such as racial and
economic discrimination.
Sexton, supra note 8, at 430.
114. See PUNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING PREGNANCY, supra note 18.
115. See id.
116. See Punishing Women for Their Behavior During Pregnancy, supra note 18, at 9
(quoting Hortensia Amaro et aI., Violence During Pregnancy and Substance Use, 80 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 575, 578 (1990». Substance abusers often battle the demons of their own
violent childhoods or current domestic situations, and tum to alcohol and drugs to "selfmedicate" and "alleviate the pain and anxiety of living under the constant threat of
violence." [d. Clinical studies have found that persons who abuse alcohol
are more likely to report histories of physical and/or sexual abuse than
persons in general populations . . .. Epidemiological surveys of adolescent
populations also document strong association between an abuse history and
alcohol or drug abuse, supporting speculation that traumatic early life events
may increase vulnerability to alcohol and drug abuse.
PATRICIA ANN HARRISON, PH.D., CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY TREATMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
PLAN 8 (Department of Human Services Chemical Dependency Program Div. Ed., 1992)
(photo. reprint 1993) [hereinafter CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY TREATMENT PLAN].
117. For example,
adverse pregnancy outcomes (miscarriages, low birthweight, and infant
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These factors do not excuse irresponsible behavior, but an effective
program of rehabilitation must consider a woman's personal and cultural
profile.
The problem of alcohol use and abuse during pregnancy crosses all
class and cultural boundaries, making a uniform or unilateral response
almost impossible to achieve.118 Government intrusion disproportionately
affects women of color and women with little or no income. 119 Poor
women of color, in particular, have the least access to decent prenatal care,
and yet mandatory reporting laws predominantly target these women. 120
Because they often must rely on public clinics, and may lack access to the
resources that will help them "conform to the white, middle-class standard
of motherhood,,,121 these women bear the brunt of enforcement efforts. In
sum, they are subject to circumstances that raise several equal protection
questions.
The Mutual Responsibility Approach for addressing FASIFAE is built
on a foundation of "cultural competency" and deconstruction of "social
stigmatization. ,,122 Cultural competency in a social system requires all
concerned to "draw on community-based values, traditions and customs,
and to work with knowledgeable persons of and from the community to
develop focused interventions and other supportS.,,123 A system of cultural
competency, for example, treats women of color's individual and cultural
values with sensitivity. Such a system recognizes the existence of racism,
but does not allow racism to be an excuse for harmful or destructive

mortality) are more likely in homeless women with substance abuse because
they are usually poorly nourished and have limited access to prenatal health
care and substance abuse treatment services. In one comparative study of
homeless women in New York City, 39 percent of pregnant homeless
women were found to have received no prenatal care, compared to only 14
percent of low-income women living in public housing communities, and 9
percent of the general population.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PRACTICAL APPROACHES IN THE TREATMENT OF
WOMEN WHO ABUSE ALcOHOL AND OTHER DRUGS 43-44 (1994) [hereinafter PRACTICAL
APPROACHES]. FASIFAE are symptoms of broader social concerns. One FAS Task Force
member noted in the a community meeting that it's
hard for people to stay healthy when the resources aren't there, and in the
Phillips neighborhood [of Minneapolis] there is no grocery store with fresh
produce or fresh juice. We need to make sure communities have good food
and adequate housing available. One of the striking characteristics of
prenatal alcohol exposure is poor nutrition, and we need to make sure that
poor families have good nutrition.
FASIFAE Task Force Public Hearing, Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter
Minneapolis Task Force Hearing].
118. See Dufour et. aI., supra note 53.
119. Roberts, supra note 15, at 1422.
120. See Schroedel & Peretz, supra note 15.
121. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 1422.
122. PRACTICAL ApPROACHES, supra note 117, at 113, 124-25 (citations omitted).
123. [d. (citation omitted).
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behavior. 124 Cooperative relationships forged between non-coercive
treatment networks and grassroots community and spiritual organizations
catering to the distinct needs of different racial and income groups are
necessary to fuel a value system analysis of FAS in Minnesota.
The social stigmatization suffered by pregnant substance-abusers often
deters women from seeking help. As 'bad mothers,' they are haunted by
negative reactions from all levels of the legal, social service and greater
communities. 125 The stigma of addiction combined with racial prejudice,
poverty, domestic violence, unemployment and other emotional or physical
stressors contribute to a woman's feelings of isolation and
dis empowerment. The presence of these stresses, in tum, may make her
less willing to take responsibility for her actions and to seek help. If the
system is working against her through threats of punishment or restraint,
she will be immobilized. The Mutual Responsibility Approach recognizes
that this woman needs the most help of all.
c) Universal Prenatal Treatment and Education as Community Values
A fundamental disjuncture exists between coercive and proactive state
measures. According to one commentator,
[w]hen the state intervenes to address substance abuse
during pregnancy, the pregnant woman is forced to follow
the dictates of the state. In contrast, when the state offers
assistance to a pregnant woman, it is facilitating and
expanding her choices so that, through her own free will, she
may make decisions beneficial to both herself and her
unborn child. 126
To adequately address the problem of FASIFAE, the Mutual
Responsibility Approach must be responsive to as many philosophies of
treatment as possible, including treatment on demand, and must recognize
that addiction is not a personal failing but rather a bona fide disease. 127
124. See id. at 114 (citations omitted).
125. See id. at 125.
126. Linden, supra note 86, at 135.
Cultural feminist theory, as applied to this problem, has two implications.
First, cultural feminism stands for the proposition that society has an
affirmative obligation to act in order to aid pregnant women addicted to
controlled substances. Second, in fulfilling this obligation, society should
act in a facilitative, rather than in an adversarial manner.
Id. at 114.
127. See Julia Elizabeth Jones, State Intervention in Pregnancy, 52 LA. L. REv. 1159,
1174 (1992). According to the American Medical Association, "it is clear that addiction is
not simply the product of a failure of individual willpower." Id. "Punishing a person for
something that is beyond his or her control is not an effective deterrent to the punished
behavior." /d. See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (narcotic addiction not
a punishable crime). Alcohol abuse is defined by diagnostic criteria developed by the
American Psychiatric Association and published in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
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Treatment is generally defined to include detoxification, inpatient or
outpatient care and counseling, maintenance, rehabilitation and, in some
. d
'
128
cases, Iong-term reSI' d
ence'III a superVIse
enVIronment.
Treatment cannot be based on judgmental perspective. No good can
come of a regimen that presumes pregnant substance abusers are operating
solely from bad or selfish motives. In place of judgmental perspectives, a
holistic approach that contemplates the many barriers that a woman must
overcome to obtain treatment is a vital starting point for the healing
129
Not all women will respond to this approach, but in truth, the
process.
small minority of hardcore users who will not respond to this approach are
unlikely to utilize any support without state intervention. 130 Treatment
philosophies must address the needs of this minority, but an entire recovery
network cannot be directed toward the worst abusers without treading on
the protected arena of individual rights. This problem would be mitigated
if the state made a commitment to offer prenatal alcohol treatment on
demand without threat of potential penalties.
The failure of community education to curb the growing trend in
drinking during pregnancy demonstrates that earlier intervention and more
targeted efforts must be made. Social marketing has been extremely
effective in informing the public about high blood pressure, cigarette
smoking, safe sex, screening for breast or prostate cancer and other 'needto-know' campaigns.131 The Mutual Responsibility Approach emphasizes
education over punitive or coercive measures, but education cannot begin
at age 21, the legal drinking age. The educational process must occur in
middle and high schools as part of health and sexuality curricula, perhaps
even during the later years of elementary education, when children are
already receiving classroom exposure to anti-drug use messages. In
addition, prevention campaigns must be conducted in all communities from
rural to urban, and in all types of neighborhoods, wealthy and poor, so that
the broadest audience can be reached. 132
Mental Disorders. See CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY TREATMENT PLAN, supra note 116, at 4.
128. See PRACTICAL APPROACHES, supra note 117, at 265.
129. See id. at 115.
130. See FASIFAE Task Force Public Hearing, Willmar, Minn. (Oct. 15, 1997). A social
worker commented that
[w Jith pregnant women using alcohol, we need a tiered approach. Education
will reach some women, and others will respond to supportive services.
Some will respond to neither, but need a "strong arm" approach, which also
must be part of our approach to the problem. Some women are receptive to
quitting at first, but need [aJ firm supportive environment, because it's hard
for a woman to sustain those good intentions throughout pregnancy.
Id.
131. See Anita Sharpe, Atlanta Center Uses Prizes and Contests to Educate Women About
Preparing for Childbirth, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 1, 1998, at A18. See also Interview
with Deborah Thorp, M.D., supra note 8.
132. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 13. The FAS Task Force recommended
countering high-profile alcohol advertising with more prevention messages and ordinances
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d) Clash of Fetal and Sex Equality Rights: A Balancing of Interests
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
individuals from discrimination based on classification or identification
with a certain disadvantaged groUp.133 The expansion of fetal rights poses a
serious threat to a woman's constitutionally-recognized liberty and privacy
rights, extending the historic legacy of inferior treatment based solely upon
a woman's procreative ability.134 Specifically, if the fetus assumes the
rights of a person under the law, then it may enjoy a superior position than
a woman in the gender-constructed social hierarchy because fetal rights
must necessarily compete against those of a pregnant woman - never a
nonpregnant woman or a man. 135 As legal theories of homicide and child
neglect evolve to accommodate the burgeoning fetal rights movement,
pregnant women will become increasingly vulnerable to an officially
sanctioned system of unfair, coercive and punitive treatment. The Mutual
Responsibility Approach recognizes that this trend cannot continue without
significantly infringing on personal rights. The maternal-fetal conflict
creates an untenable balance of power between a fetus and a pregnant
woman and, by extension, the genders, because men can never experience
this discrimination even though they access, utilize and ultimately benefit
from the very same legal system. 136
Gender-based discrimination only receives intermediate (sometimes
called "heightened") scrutiny in judicial analysis, meaning that a state
action based on sex must "serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives" in
targeting alcohol billboard placement. See id. The media must be a partner to the state in
public education efforts. See id.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
134. See MacKinnon, supra note 21, at 1309.
Many of the social disadvantages to which women have been subjected have
been predicated upon their capacity for and role in childbearing . . .. This
point is not the biological one that only women experience pregnancy and
childbirth in their bodies, but the social one: women, because of their sex,
are subjected to social inequality at each step in the process of procreation.
Encompassed are women's experiences of "fertility and infertility,
conception and contraception, pregnancy and the end of pregnancy, whether
through miscarriage, abortion, or birth and child-rearing."
[d. (quoting FACTUM OF THE INTERVENOR WOMEN'S LEGAL EDUCATION AND ACTION FuND,
at 10; Sullivan and LeMay v. Regina, No. 21494 (Can. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 22, 1989)
(decision pending)).
135. See MacKinnon, supra note 21, at 1309-10.
136. Although the equal protection clause protects women from discrimination based on
sex,
[c]urrent doctrine, however, offers women no protection against
discrimination that is based on real biological differences between women
and men, and in fact denies that such discrimination is sex-based. Women
are granted equal protection of the laws only to the extent that they are
'similarly situated' to men.
Johnsen, supra note 101, at 621.
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order to be constitutional. 137 The United States Supreme Court has chosen
not to evaluate laws affecting pregnancy as to whether they discriminate
against women, opting instead to decide whether the laws discriminate
between pregnant and nonpregnant persons, and creating a subset of
gender analysis that recognizes women and men can never be "similarly
situated" in the area of fetal development. 138 However, some federal laws
have included pregnancy discrimination within sex discrimination
regulations, especially in the area of employment protections. 139
The Mutual Responsibility Approach recognizes that the maternal-fetal
conflict has its genesis in the continued disproportionate treatment of
pregnant women under equal protection analysis. Pregnancy is an
immutable characteristic, and therefore courts should apply strict scrutiny
to any state action that qualifies a woman's right based on her pregnancy
status. 140 Further, the "similarly situated" threshold is a means of
rationalizing different treatment between the sexes. Society places a low
value on a pregnant woman's worth, especially when fetal rights are
increasingly empowered, and the practice of rationalizing further
distinctions only perpetuates long-standing polarities. 141
Fetal rights proponents argue that Roe and its progeny conflict with the
increasingly common prosecution of pregnant women who recklessly cause
death or injury to their fetuses through the use of illegal drugs or through
other forms of abuse and neglect. 142 Although the majority of judicial and
137. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Although the Supreme Court has never
applied strict scrutiny to a gender-based discrimination question, some Justices have
expressed this preference in past decisions, most notably in Frontiero v. Richardson. 411
U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973). See also Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982) (intermediate scrutiny for gender-based analysis).
138. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
139. See Johnsen, supra note 101, at 621, citing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(k) (1982»: "[W]omen
affected by pregnancy, children, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes ...." Johnson, supra note 101, at 621 n.85. See also
International Union v. Johnson Controls, where the Court held that an employer's policy of
barring all women who are capable of bearing children from jobs that involve exposure to
lead was facially discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 499 U.S.
187, 198 (1991). The Court's decision was bolstered by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
which establishes that, for the purpose of Title VII, discrimination based on pregnancy is
discrimination because of sex. See id. at 198-99 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983». See also Center for Reproductive Law and
Policy (visited Apr. 20, 1998)
<http:/www.echonyc.coml-jrnkm/wotw/us.motherhood.
htm1>.
140. See Johnsen, supra note 101, at 622. "The ability to bear children is to sex
discrimination what dark skin is to race discrimination. It is the immutable characteristic
that distinguishes the disadvantaged from the advantaged and which historically has been
used to justify the subordination of the disadvantaged." Id.
141. See id. at 624-25.
142. See Greenburg, supra note 108, at 1. "Since at least the fourteenth century, the
common law has been that the destruction of a fetus in utero is not homicide . . .. The rule
has been accepted as the established common law in every American jurisdiction that has
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statutory laws still rely on the "born alive" rule,143 some state legislatures
and courts have explored the possibility of applying child abuse and neglect
l44
These lawmaking attempts have
laws to the burgeoning rights of a fetus.
sought to regulate an astounding breadth of maternal behavior that could
negatively affect the fetus. 145 Aside from the more obvious examples of
substance abuse, proposals have defined negligent maternal behavior to
include failure to follow doctor's orders, eating 'wrong' foods, and giving
146 In Iowa, for example, the state
birth at home instead of the hospital.
assumed custody of a woman's baby, despite the fact that the child
appeared healthy, because she allegedly failed to monitor the nutritional
value of the foods she ate while pregnant. 147 Connecticut considered a bill

considered the question." Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E. 2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984).
"The live birth requirement was consistent with the concept that the fetus was an extension
of the woman." Sexton, supra note 8, at 414 n.35. It is important to note that Supreme
Courts in Florida, Kentucky, Ohio, Nevada, and Wisconsin, and many lower courts, have
often struck down drug delivery statutes because a fetus was not determined to be a person
under the applicable criminal law. See Tamar Lewin, Abuse Laws Cover Fetus, a High
Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1997, at A4. But see Whitner v. South Carolina, 492
S.E.2d 777 (1997). In Commonwealth v. Cass, for example, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that a fetus was a person for the purposes of a vehicular homicide statute. 467
N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1984). A number of similar decisions have followed. See
Sexton, supra note 8, at 415. Several states have adopted "feticide" legislation that punishes
destruction of a fetus in the same manner as murder of a person. See id. at 415. These
states include California, lllinois, Iowa, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Utah,
Washington and Wisconsin. See id. at 415 nA5.
143. See, e.g., State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625,630 (Minn. 1985).
144. See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 8 at 414-15. In the civil arena, a "majority of states now
consider fetuses that have died in utero to be 'persons' under wrongful death statutes."
Johnsen, supra note 101, at 602. See also Daniel S. Meade, Wrongful Death and the
Unborn Child: Should Viability Be a Prerequisite for a Cause of Action?, 14 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'y 421 (1998).
145. See Sexton, supra note 8, at 415. In In re Fetus Brown, the Appellate Court of
lllinois determined that it could not, however, prevent a pregnant woman from refusing
medical treatment based on her religious beliefs that blood transfusions would harm her.
689 N .E.2d 397 (1997). Pamela Rae Stewart was charged with "failing to follow her
doctor's advice to stay off her feet, refrain from sexual intercourse, refrain from taking street
drugs, and seek immediate medical attention if she experienced difficulties with the
pregnancy." Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the
Problems of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 505-06 (1992)
(quoting Mike Konon, Data Access to Fetus Case Put on Hold, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Oct. 24, 1986, at Bl, BI2).
146. See Sexton, supra note 8, at 416 nA9, quoting SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE
UNDECLARED WAR ON AMERICAN WOMEN 424 (1991).
147. See Sexton, supra note 8, at 416 nA9, quoting FALUDI, supra note 146, at 425.
In Michigan, a court held that a child could sue his mother for ingesting tetracycline while
pregnant, "allegedly resulting in discoloration of the child's teeth." Johnsen, supra note
101, at 604, citing Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. App. 1980). The court held
that the standard of liability was that of a "reasonable pregnant woman." Johnsen, supra
note 101, at 604. In other cases courts have taken custody of fetuses to enjoin drug use and
compelled women to have cesarean sections when they preferred vaginal delivery. See id. at
605 (citations omitted).
One commentator describes the criteria for a "reasonable pregnant woman" as
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that would allow the state to revoke parental rights of pregnant women who
abused illicit drugs (e.g., cocaine, marijuana, heroin) or alcohol. 148 These
laws are but a few examples of the inevitable slippery slope created by
contradictory interpretations of personhood and legislative or judicial zeal
for solutions that punish or coerce a woman during pregnancy without
offering positive alternatives like treatment or education. These laws are
cynical, short-term benefit attempts to appease public dismay with the
growing problem of drinking during pregnancy. Such laws are grossly
unfair because, under an Equal Protection analysis, they punish pregnant
women disproportionately for behavior that is deemed legal for other
members of society. In essence, such laws contemplate that a woman's
behavior during her pregnancy, legal or not, can be regulated without
regard to existing governing doctrine stating that a fetus (even when viable)
is not a person under the law. An inherent maternal-fetal conflict exists as
a result of lawmaking that assumes a hierarchy of state and fetal interests
over the interests of a woman. Because virtually every action a woman
takes while pregnant has an impact on her fetus, the maternal-fetal conflict
is debilitating to the point of incapacitation. 149
Minnesota has perpetuated the maternal-fetal conflict in the form of its
mandatory reporting laws, now broadened by the recent FAS legislation. 150
In 1989 and 1990, the state enacted legislation rejecting both the
criminalization of prenatal substance abuse and the characterization of
illicit drug use during pregnancy as child abuse in favor of creating a
follows:
Her 'prenatal duties' would include 'regular prenatal checkups, a balanced
diet with vitamin, iron, and calcium supplementation, weight control, and
judicious use of medications, tobacco, and caffeine. Alcohol and narcotic
use should be avoided entirely.' . . . In addition, 'negligent exposure to
noxious chemicals and drugs, refusal to obtain prenatal therapy, or failure to
provide a modified diet, could give rise to a cause of action.'
[d. at 607 (citations omitted).
In certain extreme cases, a woman could be found negligent for "not taking
affirmative actions to minimize risks to the fetus even before they could possibly have
known they were pregnant. ... Finally, if a woman gave birth at home using a midwife
after a physician strongly recommended hospital delivery 'she could be liable for fetal
neglect. '" [d.
148. See Bob Curley, Prenatal Drug Policies Need to Address Alcohol Too, ALcOHOLISM
& DRUG ABUSE WK., Apr. 1, 1996, at 3.
149. See Johnsen, supra note 101, at 606-7. Drug and alcohol use, as well as smoking,
have proven harmful to the fetus, but there are other possible hazards such as workplace
risks, x-rays (inadequate shielding), certain prescription and over-the-counter medications
(the acne medication Isotretinoin a.k.a. Accutane, androgen hormones, diethystilbestrol or
DES are all known teratogens; lithium, antibiotics like streptomycin and tetracycline,
anticoagulants, thyroid drugs, and anticonvulsants are also potentially harmful), and even
caffeine, though studies are inconclusive. See Vicki Seltzer, Be Careful What Substances
Fetus is Exposed To, CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec. 24,1997, at 44.
150. MINN. STAT. § 626.5561 (1997). See also Marilena Lencewicz, Don't Crack the
Cradle: Minnesota's Effective Solution for the Prevention of Prenatal Substance AbuseAnalysis of Minnesota Statute Section 626.5561, 63 REv. JUR. u.P.R. 599, 620-21 (1994).
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system of mandatory reporting. I51 It is encouraging that Minnesota has
consistently chosen to steer clear of criminalizing maternal behavior, but
the mandatory reporting laws are by no means irreproachable. Civil
commitment is sought only if a pregnant woman refuses recommended
services or fails to succeed in treatment. I52 The law purports to
"reconceptualize ... [the] mother and fetus as isolated adversaries.,,153
However, the law defines substance abuse during pregnancy as child
neglect, skewing the balance toward the fetus as the intended beneficiary of
the statutory benefit, rather than the mother. I54 The use of child neglect
laws emphasizes the rights of a fetus, a nonperson under the law, over a
person in possession of civil rights who may act more responsively to
treatment-directed personal responsibility programs if her interests are
characterized as (at least) equal with those of her unborn child. 155
A social and legal system that questions a woman's actions during
pregnancy without respecting her individual rights or offering the means to
enact change serves as yet another example of institutional gender-based
oppression. However, here the unfair treatment comes in the sympathetic
guise of fetal rights. In other words, the continued trend towards punitive
and coercive action in controlling behavior during pregnancy uses fetal
rights as a tool for defining (and segregating) women in terms of their
childbearing role, furthering their subordination in both the dominant legal
and social hierarchies. Perhaps this turn of events is a not-so-subtle
response from a patriarchal system threatened by the tremendous strides
women have made in attaining influence within traditionally male power
structures. I56 Pregnancy has become the last frontier of gender regulation.
e) FAS is Not Just a Woman's Issue
Society has a tendency to characterize problems by the groups directly
151. See Lencewicz, supra note 150, at 621 (the Act mandates that reports of illicit drug
use (and now alcohol use) should be forwarded to a social service agency).
152. See id.
153. Id. at 622.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 625.
The rationale behind using fetal rights laws to control the actions of women
during pregnancy is strikingly similar to that used in the past to exclude
women from the paid labor force and to confine them to the 'private' sphere.
Fetal rights could be used to restrict pregnant women's autonomy in both
their personal and professional lives, in decisions ranging from nutrition to
employment, in ways far surpassing any regulation of competent adult men.
The state would thus define women in terms of their childbearing capacity,
valuing the reproductive difference between women and men in such a way
as to render it impossible for women to participate as full members of
society.
Id. "Law from a male point of view combines coercion with authority, policing society
where its edges are exposed: at points of social resistance, conflict and breakdown."
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF STATE 239 (1989).
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affected. This limiting construct characterizes FAS and FAE as women's
issues. Under this narrow view it is only possible to prevent these
disorders during pregnancy. The woman is the sole problem-solver.
Compartmentalization makes it easier for social and legal systems to target
women's behaviors for control. The Mutual Responsibility Approach
considers this point of view reductivist. The environment that engenders
FAS and FAE is inhabited by men and women, adults and children alike.
Essentially these problems affect everyone, however indirectly.
The saying, "it takes a village to raise a child," may be overused at
times in the political arena, but its intrinsic message is meaningful to the
Mutual Responsibility Approach. 157 A community's interest in a child's
welfare needs to begin with the pregnant woman, the person who bears the
responsibility-the maternal duty-to provide a safe, healthy environment
for the development of her fetus. However, her duty does not exist in a
vacuum. The FAS Task Force recognized as much by stating that
"[p]revention efforts must not overlook males.,,158 Men can be involved in
parenting groups and other education efforts that increase their stake in the
developing fetus and encourage them to support their pregnant partner in
avoiding potentially harmful substances. 159 If the father of the fetus (or
relationship partner) is no longer in the pregnant woman's life, she needs to
rely on support systems from within her community-groups of other
single pregnant women, for example, or counseling services that will teach
her responsible behavior and provide resources that will help her avoid
turning to alcohol for self-medication.
In sum, under the Mutual Responsibility Approach, the cycle of rights
between the state and the pregnant woman begins and ends with maternal
duty, but this duty cannot stand alone. Although women do not have
enforceable rights to prenatal assistance that they can assert against the
state,160 the state nonetheless has a level of moral commitment it should
157. An African proverb which has become widely used in child-development circles (and
also the title of a 1995 book by Hillary Rodham Clinton). See Douglas 1. Besharov, First
Lady Knows Best, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1996, at Book World, at Xl. According to
Besharov, experts use the proverb "to mean that parents cannot do it all on their own, that
they need support in raising children - and that children benefit from many non-parental
influences, including the extended family, other adults, and various community institutions."
[d.
158. SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 23.
159. See Duluth Task Force Hearing, supra note 62 (statement of Public Health Nurse).
"A woman's partner and her community are appropriate targets for preventive interventions
and subjects for preventive intervention research." See also Executive Summary, supra note
29.
'
160. This is in contrast to the right to due process in welfare cases, first announced in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), where the Supreme Court held that recipients of
AFDC benefits had a right to a post-termination hearing because terminating benefits
impacts important property interests. Without a hearing, recipients whose benefits were
denied could possibly die because their benefits fulfilled a "brutal need"-the necessities of
life. [d. at 261 (citing Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.Supp. 893,899,900 (1968)).
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meet in order to fully serve this segment of its constituency. In an
environment where fetal rights are achieving greater recognition at the
expense of women's rights, it is imperative for the state to return its focus
to the real problem at hand-a woman who drinks excessively while
pregnant is a woman in cnSlS. She is not a criminal. She has not
permanently failed to meet her maternal duty. The Mutual Responsibility
Approach holds the state morally accountable in the same way that the state
seeks to hold women morally accountable. In a democracy where checks
and balances are the norm, this seems the only fair analysis.

IV. PUTTING THE MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY APPROACH
TO WORK: MANDATORY REPORTING, CIVIL
COMMITMENT AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN THE
CONTEXT OF FAS PREVENTION
The reasons for using a value system to analyze legal responses to
FASIFAE are twofold. First, once one goes beyond the physiological
aspects of the disorder, the issue of alcohol use during pregnancy emerges
as complex and emotionally-charged. No single perspective could possibly
encapsulate the multitude of external and internal forces affecting a
woman's use of alcohol during pregnancy. Therefore, a comprehensive
system working toward the goal of reconciling the maternal-fetal conflict is
required. Second, an inclusive approach asserted in combination with
broad-based healing resources and community education will encourage
women to seek support and participate in their own recoveries without fear
of reprisal.
Proponents of coercive or punitive approaches to the problem of
alcohol abuse during pregnancy assert that these methods will serve as a
specific deterrent to the mother and as a general deterrent to other women
who might act in the same manner. 161 Under one tenet of utilitarianism, a
law's success in achieving deterrence is evaluated by weighing whether the
infliction of punishment or penalties results in greater good to society than
the harm necessarily suffered by the individual who is punished. 162
161. See DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 14. See also James Denison, The Efficacy and
Constitutionality a/Criminal Punishment/or Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REv.
1104, 1120 (1991). "Imprisonment might effect specific deterrence of fetal abuse by
containing the individual convict's destructive behavior toward her fetus and preventing
further harm. Additionally, fetal abuse law might generally deter the maternal substanceabusing populace who feared the prospect of jail time and would opt to cure themselves of
their addiction." Id. at 1121.
162. See Denison, supra note 161, at 1120 (citations omitted).
Empirical evidence that these deterrent effects would occur would justify the
law from a utilitarian perspective. However, if the harm the laws themselves
inflicted were greater than the benefit of enforcing them, they would not be
justified. If, for example, the discomfort of imprisonment and involuntary
detoxification that convicted fetal abusers suffered were greater than the
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F ASIFAB are serious problems facing this generation and forthcoming
generations, but under a utilitarian approach the benefits of deterrence from
punitive and coercive measures do not favor society to such an extent that
individual rights of women can be compromised loosely. Punishment only
addresses a portion of the problem. By temporarily detaining a woman for
her actions, society addresses her needs at a discrete and finite level. The
conditions under which she lives, both on a micro and macro level, are
disregarded elements of the long-term resolution.
The trend towards punishment of expectant mothers portends a social
benefit realized through unacceptably high costs. These costs are not only
monetary-they encompass personal and community morale as well. An
assaultive retributivist point of view is emerging in the United States
toward women who abuse substances while pregnant. Retribution satisfies
society'S thirst for revenge against perceived 'bad mothers'; punishment
demonstrates moral distaste for what is perceived as an immoral act. 163
Protective retribution is also implied: "[p]unishment is not inflicted because
society wants to hurt wrongdoers but because punishment is a means of
securing moral balance in the society."l64 Retributive approaches tend to
suggest that society has constructed a universal line of morality over which
an individual cannot cross without consequences. Such a line is necessary
to a certain point, for without laws there would be anarchy. On the other
hand, immutable lines do not address the reasons or motivations behind an
individual's questionable behavior. In the realm of fetal rights, the line
created by maternal duty tends to circumscribe a pregnant woman's private
realm of morality. Under a retributive system, a pregnant woman's
personal morality may conflict with society's universal morality, at times
without her even knowing it, or without her control.
Personal
responsibility is important, but a retributive scheme does not allow a
woman to recognize her role in assuming maternal duty. Swift punishment
serves only harmful purposes when the target of retribution is a pregnant
woman who drinks.
Under the Mutual Responsibility Approach advocated by this paper, a
universal morality is not assumed and therefore neither assaultive nor
protective retribution is broached as a meaningful way of addressing the
A rehabilitative approach contemplates the
problem of FASIFAB.
possibility of redemption. 165 Certainly not everyone can be reformed.
However, starting from a place of hope rather than one of condemnation is
important for women who are clearly acting in an irresponsible manner, but

Id. at
163.
164.
165.

1(¥*!i

extent to which enforcement would curb the fetal abuse problem, the laws
would not be justified according to utilitarian theory.
1121.
See DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 12.
Id.
See id. at 15.
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do not have the personal or societal support systems in place to stop. It
simply is not the case that pregnant women who drink deserve to be
punished; they deserve help, when and where they need it, without
imposition of a biased public morality. Fetal rights are never implicated by
any of society's punitive or coercive approaches toward stopping pregnant
women's behavior. Those rights are instead elevated above those of the
woman, the person who is in the best (if temporarily disabled) position to
make the right decisions for her fetus, and her future.
The uniform public morality suggested by the retributive model does
not respect the individual pregnant woman's morality and therefore
condemns without considering what the inevitable impact of punishment
will be on society. For example, many commentators have suggested that a
trend toward punitive and coercive measures will increase the incidence of
abortion in this country. The state will be coercing women to seek
abortions, based solely on the perception that they lack a choice between
their personal freedom and the threat of arrest, incarceration or involuntary
l66
civil commitment.
A woman is improperly deprived of her right of
privacy guaranteed by the Roe protections when the state takes away her
choices. Society does not benefit when abortions are performed under such
coercive circumstances because the procedure is meant to be a private,
167
voluntary choice asserted by a woman in consultation with her doctor.
A
myriad of rights are attacked in a punitive environment and nothing is
gained because the long-term benefits of treatment and education are
denied the priority they deserve.
A)

MANDATORY REpORTING

Minnesota law requires that a physician who suspects alcohol or drug
abuse order toxicology tests on pregnant women. 168 The state legislature
166. See PUNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING PREGNANCY, supra note 18, at
3. A Florida court noted that criminal sanctions might compel women to terminate
pregnancies to avoid arrest in the case of drug use. "A woman may abort her child or avoid
prenatal care or treatment out of fear of prosecution." Johnson v. State, 602 So.2d 1288,
1294 (Fla. 1992). The National Right to Life Committee and the United States Catholic
Conference "oppose special punishment of women who use drugs during pregnancy because
it has proven ineffective to solve the problem of perinatal drug use and encourages abortions
as a means of avoiding punitive measures." A. Michael Lee, State ex. reI. Angela M. W. v.
Kruzicki: The Wisconsin Court of Appeals Introduces a Dangerous New Weapon in the
Battle Over "Fetal Rights", 30 GA. L. REv. 1183, 1219 n.200 (1996) (citing Dawn E.
Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives
After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 179,212-13 (1989».
167. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
168. MINN. STAT. § 626.5562 (1995). See also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PRENATAL SUBSTANCE EXPOSURE: STATE
CHILD WELFARE LAWS AND PROCEDURES, 7 (May 1992) [hereinafter PRENATAL SUBSTANCE
EXPOSURE]. When a test is positive, a report is made to the appropriate child welfare agency
but physicians also have discretion to report suspected use even if toxicology tests are
negative. See MINN. STAT. § 626.5561 (1995). Not all cases are investigated by child
welfare, but if an allegation is accepted and the fetus is considered to be at risk for abuse or
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has now expanded the statutes to give legal immunity to health care
providers who report women who drink. 169 This law departs from the
federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, which also requires
health care providers to report child abuse. 170 However, the federal Act
exempts the fetus, requiring a live birth before "asserting the force of
law."171
Mandatory reporting with or without legal immunity is problematic
within the Mutual Responsibility Approach contemplated by this paper. It
creates a maternal-fetal conflict, imposes limited concepts of personal
maternal duty, discriminates against low-income women and communities
of color, and promotes treatment in a solely coercive manner. Mandatory
reporting is part of 'managing' a woman's pregnancy, representing a
significant intrusion by the state and placing morality-based obligations to
the fetus over a woman's rights to privacy and bodily integrity!72 It also
places health care providers in a difficult ethical position: the doctor-patient
relationship is confidential, with good reason. 173 A patient who can speak
freely with her doctor will likely receive the best care possible. However,
now that Minnesota health care providers can report with immunity,
women will be hesitant about openly discussing concerns regarding
personal alcohol use during pregnancy!74
Women who are drinking and women who are not drinking are both
affected by mandatory reporting. In the wake of mandatory reporting,
women who are drinking will be even less likely to seek the help they need,
and even non-drinking women may refrain from asking questions for fear
of a false report. The deterrent effect of this coercive measure actually
backfires, creating an atmosphere of suspicion and deception, an
unqualifiedly poor health care environment that disregards the paramount
value of receiving vital prenatal care. 175 This result may cause more
women to totally avoid visiting health care providers, resulting in an
neglect, a caseworker is assigned to assess the home environment. See PRENATAL
SUBSTANCE EXPOSURE at 5. When prenatal substance abuse is determined to be a problem,
local agencies tend to work with multidisciplinary teams of child welfare workers, chemical
dependency specialists, and public health nurses to address individual needs. See id. at 10.
169. See supra note 5.
170. 42 U.S.c. §§ 5101-5107 (1989) (quoted in Sexton, supra note 8, at 419).
171. [d.
172. For further discussion of the notion of mandatory reporting, see John A. Robertson,
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L.
REv. 405,437 (1983).
173. See supra note 9.
174. See Sexton, supra note 8, at 420. Sexton states that "mandatory reporting
requirements can deter pregnant mothers from seeking prenatal services and drug treatment
programs." [d.
175. See id. "Doctors in Minnesota believe that the Reporting of Maltreatment of Minors
Act is actually deterring pregnant drug users from treatment and causing them to withhold
information from their doctors, despite the fact that the act imposes no criminal sanctions."
[d.
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increase in risky pregnancies and home births, which are not always the
best or safest choice. 176 In other cases, a woman may forgo care for the
entire length of her pregnancy and then arrive at the hospital with
absolutely no medical history that could assist the staff in her delivery.I77
If an emergency should arise, dangerous and costly mistakes are more
l1'ke1y to occur. 178
Poverty and race have proven to be significant barriers to receiving
adequate prenatal care.
Mandatory reporting requirements, further
liberated by legal immunity, will increase the unequal enforcement of
reporting in low-income communities and disproportionate reporting of
women of color who must rely on public clinics for prenatal care.179
Women receiving private health care are simply not reported as often as
those receiving publicly-funded care, especially from diverse racial and
ethnic communities. I80 If women who have the means to afford private
health care are not being reported on the same basis as women of color or
low income women, equal protection concerns are raised on two levels:
discriminatory state action based on income status and race. I81
Racial discrimination is analyzed under strict scrutiny, the most
rigorous standard of judicial review, since race is considered a suspect
class. I82 To determine whether the mandatory reporting law with legal
176. See id.
177. See Chavkin, supra note 8, at 244.
178. See id.
179. See Sexton, supra note 8, at 422. See also Roberts, supra note 15.
180. See Schroedel & Peretz, supra note 15, at 341. Most studies are in relation to drug
use, but a similar result may be inferred for alcohol use as well, since the circumstances for
reporting are no different. "[E]ven though pregnant white women were slightly more likely
to test positive for drug use, African American women were ten times more likely to have
those results reported to law enforcement officials." [d. (citations omitted).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
"protects individuals from discrimination that is based on their membership in a
disadvantaged group." Johnsen, supra note 101, at 620.
182. A statute will be upheld only if it is found to be necessary (not merely appropriate) to
the attainment of some compelling (not merely desirable) governmental interest. Suspect
classes include race, national origin and alienage. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153
n.4 (1938):
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
other types of legislation . .. [or] whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry.
See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-78 (1986) (applying strict
scrutiny to an affirmative action layoff provision in a collective bargaining agreement);
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-34 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny to a lower court's
award of child custody to the father based upon the race of the stepfather); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215, 219 (1944) (holding that all legal restrictions which curtail
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immunity for health care professionals constitutes invidious racial
discrimination, one must determine whether a compelling state interest
I83
exists.
If a less discriminatory alternative is available it must be used in
I84
place of the more restrictive law.
Mandatory reporting with built-in legal immunity provides an example
of 'purposeful' discrimination in the sense that it is a neutral law
I85
Some may argue that the
administered in an unequal manner.
disproportionate results of mandatory reporting are only a single factor for
discerning intent and therefore strict scrutiny does not apply without further
evidence of purposeful state action. However, there are many strong
arguments to the contrary.I86 The United States Supreme Court has
recognized state-sanctioned selection processes that produce "unexplained
racial disparities" as evidence of discriminatory purpose.I 87 In Pinellas
County, Florida, for example, an African American woman arrested for
exposing her newborn to cocaine made a prima facie case of
unconstitutional racial discrimination based upon statistics on substance
abuse reporting by race in the county.I88 From a broader perspective,
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect and subject to strict
scrutiny).
183. See supra note 182.
184. See id.
185. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-4 (1886) (holding that the facts of
the case established that the challenged ordinances were administered exclusively against a
certain class of persons in such a manner that regardless of the intent of the ordinances as
adopted, they were applied in such a manner as to amount to a practical denial by the state
of the equal protection of the laws). There must be purposeful discrimination in order to use
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The antidiscrimination approach
identifies the primary threat to equality as the government's 'failure to treat
Black people as individuals without regard to race.' The goal of the
antidiscrimination principle is to ensure that all members of society are
treated in a color-blind or race-neutral fashion. Under this view of equality,
the function of the equal protection clause is to outlaw specific acts
committed by individual government officials that discriminate against
individual Black complainants because of race.
Roberts, supra note 15, at 1451 (citations omitted).
186. See, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 229.
Although recognized violations are not limited to explicit racial
classifications, an invidious purpose cannot be inferred solely from the
adverse consequences of racially neutral policies. . .. As one commentator
has noted, 'the Justices have demanded proof ... that officials were out to
get a person or group on account of race. '
Roberts, supra note 15, at 1452 (citations omitted).
187. See cases cited supra note 186. See also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977),
in which the Court held that a prima facie case of intentional discrimination in the county's
grand jury selection process was proven by evidence of large statistical disparities.
188. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 1453.
The New England Journal of Medicine study of pregnant women in Pinellas
County. . . found that only about twenty-six percent of those who used
drugs were Black. Yet over ninety percent of Florida prosecutions for drug
abuse during pregnancy have been brought against Black women. The
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analysis can also be made of the dominant "social patterns and institutions
that perpetuate the inferior status" of women of color in mandatory
reporting. 189 An unintended "racial hierarchy" may be perpetuated by state
.
Iead'mg to unequ al treatment. 190
actIOn,
Establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory intent is more
difficult for the class of low-income women. Strict scrutiny would not
apply because poverty is not a suspect class, and therefore the government
has less of a burden to meet in setting forth its interest in protecting the
fetus from maternal substance abuse. The applicable standard would be
either "intermediate scrutiny," meaning that a classification must be
"substantially related to important governmental objectives" 191 or even
"rational basis," where the state has little burden to meet in enacting its
laws equitably.192 Despite facing greater obstacles in obtaining a favorable
standard of review, low-income women might successfully pose a due
process challenge. For example, a lack of notice affects a protected liberty
interest if public clinics fail to explain a pregnant woman's potential
liability when she discusses her alcohol abuse during a doctor's visit. 193
Potential causes of action would rely on studies establishing
disproportionate community impact to establish a case of arbitrary
enforcement based on race or low-income status. Studies similar in
theoretical approach to those undertaken by the Center for Race and
Poverty, addressing disproportionate resource availability based on race
defendant could buttress her case with the study's finding that, despite
similar rates of substance abuse, Black women were ten times more likely
than white women to be reported to public health authorities for substance
abuse during pregnancy.
[d. (citations omitted). See Chasnoff et al., supra note 66, at 1202.
189. Roberts, supra note 15, at 1454.
190. [d.
191. This standard is commonly used in gender classification analysis. See, e.g., Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to Oklahoma statutes
making gender-based differentials regarding the sale of nonintoxicating beer). The rational
basis or mere rationality review is most often used in state economic/regulatory lawmaking.
192. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (applying
rational basis to state statute banning the sale of milk in plastic non-returnable containers but
allowing such sale in other types of non-returnable containers). If a statute completely lacks
rationality it will be overturned under Equal Protection analysis. See, e.g., Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 442 (1982) (holding that Illinois fair employment practices
act violated the Equal Protection clause because it established two classes of claimantsthose whose claims were processed within the 120 day period and whose claims were given
full consideration on the merits, and those whose claims were not processed within the 120
days and whose claims were accordingly terminated).
193. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976) (holding that reputation alone, apart
from more tangible interests, was neither liberty nor property by itself sufficient to invoke
the protections of the procedural due process clause, and thus could not support a § 1983
claim). Paul suggested that liberty interests include those guaranteed by specific provisions
of the Constitution or Bill of Rights as well as those included under the penumbral rights of
privacy and freedom from bodily restraint. [d. at 711-12. Further, a liberty interest includes
not being subjected to state conduct that impinges upon a prior freedom. See id.
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inherent within the Minneapolis public schools, could be successful in
finding skewed mandatory reporting. 194 Interested legal advocacy groups
could pursue further action to address this issue.
Mandatory reporting places health care providers in a difficult position
in relation to the state. Health care providers are bound to a duty of doctorpatient confidentiality, yet they must judge when and how to report their
patients to legal and social authorities. 195 Reporting can have a tremendous
impact on a pregnant woman's life aside from the potential loss of liberty.
If she has children already, she may lose parental rights either temporarily
or permanently. There are circumstances where a woman should receive
help for the benefit of herself and her family. However, the state must
decide which need is greater, the woman's medical care during her
pregnancy, or the ambiguous fetal interest. As the mandatory reporting law
suggests, the woman is not the focus of the legislative agenda. The
maternal-fetal conflict is exacerbated by such a situation.
With or without legal immunity, mandatory reporting violates many
important privileges and rights and should therefore be removed from the
list of health care provider duties in Minnesota. If treatment on demand is
available, doctors will be able to make referrals when appropriate. Doctors
will also have a much better chance to counsel those who need the most
information about the risks they are taking by drinking while pregnant,
because the deterrent effect created by the threat of punitive or coercive
action will be removed. 196
B)

CIVIL COMMITMENT

Involuntary civil commitment is a legal process "operating at the
confluence of the public safety, justice and social service systems whereby
an individual is found to pose harm to self or others.,,197 Minnesota was the
194. See John Powell, Segregation and Educational Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public
Schools, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'y 337 (1996) and Paula G. Forbes and James A.
Cunningham, Jr., Desegregation & the Minneapolis Public Schools, 17 RAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL'y 209 (1996). See also supra note 187.
195. Interview with Deborah Thorp, M.D., supra note 8. ''The state ought to stay out of
practicing medicine. If I don't report I can get into a lot of trouble. It shouldn't have to be
my responsibility, I shouldn't have to play detective. Personally I don't think there should
be any regUlations." Id. "Forcing the medical community to police the problem of drug
abuse during pregnancy triggers ethical issues the medical community does not want to
face." Sexton, supra note 8, at 429. See also supra note 9.
196. See Lee, supra note 166, at 1219 n.198. ''The fact that vertical transmission of AIDS
is most common among drug-using women is an additional and particularly forceful reason
to ensure that these women are not driven away from the health-care system." Id. (citation
omitted). Given that many women who abuse alcohol may not be using safer sex practices,
this is yet another clear argument for keeping the channels of communication with health
care open and nonpunitive.
197. PUNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING PREGNANCY, supra note 18, at 6,
quoting Sandra Garcia, Ethical and Legal Issues Associated with Substance Abuse by
Pregnant and Parenting Women, J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS, 101, 105 (Jan.-Mar. 1997).
Commitment statutes "limited to drug or alcohol addiction use such criteria as 'addiction to
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first state in the country to amend its civil commitment laws to include
women who abuse drugs during pregnancy.198 The FAS Task Force tried
unsuccessfully to influence legislation that would make alcohol use during
pregnancy grounds for involuntary civil commitment. 199
Under the Mutual Responsibility Approach offered in this paper,
involuntary civil commitment is not a desirable form of 'treatment' for
pregnant women who drink because it is punitive by nature. The maternalfetal conflict is once again heightened, maternal duty is negated entirely
because the state assumes jurisdiction over a woman's autonomy, and a
disproportionate impact on women of color and low-income women is
possible. Further, in instances of budget and cost-cutting measures, the
course of treatment becomes subordinate to incapacitation of the
individual, rendering a civilly committed pregnant woman essentially a
2oo
prisoner with no rehabilitative support.
Like mandatory reporting, civil commitment is not a 'selfimplementing' procedure. Setting the process into motion requires an
affirmative act in the form of a report to social or law enforcement
authorities, followed by a court hearing. 201 Such a process suggests that
fundamental rights, including privacy, liberty and bodily integrity, in
addition to equal protection concerns, will once again be called into
question. Without treatment on demand, expanded treatment options or a
more comprehensive universal prenatal care plan in place, it makes little
sense (and it is constitutionally overbroad) to rely on involuntary civil
commitment for all women who drink during pregnancy.
Civil
commitment should be a last resort for the individuals who simply cannot
beat their addictions without a strong-arm approach. 202 While the fact
remains that some women are addicted beyond their own control, laws that
punish without providing some measure of treatment and prenatal care [lIst

drugs' or 'habitual drug use.' These criteria are generally used in conjunction with other
criteria that focus on the impact of the drug or alcohol dependency on the individual."
Chavkin, supra note 8, at 267 (citations omitted). This observation assumes new
significance when the fetus is involved, especially if the state is asserting a fetal right.
198. See MINN. STAT. § 253B.02 (1995). See supra note 11.
199. See supra notes 11-14. The following states explicitly allow involuntary commitment
of alcoholics under their general civil commitment statutes: Indiana, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin. See Chavkin,
supra note 8, at 274 n.285 (citations omitted). South Dakota recently passed a law allowing
judges to order pregnant women into treatment centers if a judge suspects they have been
drinking too much. The amount of excessive alcohol intake will be left to the court's
discretion. See James Langton, Mothers-to-be Who Drink Face Detention Under New Laws
in Two American States, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), May 31, 1998, at 37. The South
Dakota law empowers friends or relatives of a pregnant woman caught drinking to commit
her to an emergency detoxification clinic for a period of up to two days. See id. Judges can
order a pregnant woman confined for the full nine months of the pregnancy. See id.
200. See Chavkin, supra note 8, at 262.
201. See id. at 243.
202. See id. at 287.
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only remove a woman's right to make her own decisions, perpetuating
personal and societal isolation that can only aggravate the problem. 203
Civil commitment is a 'paternalistic' state tool that forces a pregnant
woman into a short-term treatment situation that mayor may not address
her needs. 204 A pregnant woman is placed in civil confinement because the
state is interested in protecting her fetus; one could argue that the state is
only secondarily concerned with helping the woman achieve sobriety.20s

203. See Bob Herbert, Wisconsin Lawmaker's Hidden Agenda, STAR TruB., June 16, 1998,
at 13A. In the article, Herbert quoted Lynn Paltrow, a New York lawyer, who stated that
not only is the woman being punished, in the sense that her life now comes
under state scrutiny from the moment of fertilization, but she is no longer
allowed, like every other adult citizen, to make her own medical decisions
about prenatal care, abortion or what kind of drug or alcohol treatment is
best for her.
/d. According to Herbert, "Alcoholism and drug addiction are illnesses. But the fetal
protection movement has not been accompanied by any serious effort to provide women
with the alcohol and drug treatment that they need--or even, for that matter, adequate
prenatal care. That is not part of the agenda." Id. The agenda Herbert refers to is the
erosion of a woman's right to bodily integrity; in essence, passage of stiffer fetal homicide,
civil commitment and other laws are a "back door" means of negating Roe. Id.
204. See Linden, supra note 86, at 126. Note that Congress did pass the Maternal and
Child Health (MCH) Services Block Grant Act that establishes a maternal-child health
program. 42 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)(A) (1998). MCH health care services "are designed to
reduce infant morality, increase immunization of children and provide prenatal, delivery and
postpartum care for pregnant women" at designated clinics. Center for Reproductive Law
and Policy, (visited April 20, 1998) <http://www.echonyc.comf-jmhmfwotw/
us.motherhood.html>.
205. But see Chavkin, supra note 8, at 255.
Although criminal prosecutions and child abuse and neglect proceedings
tend to pit fetus against mother, the rhetoric of civil commitment systems is
far more benign. These systems are described by their supporters as
protecting the right of a child to a healthy start. However, these systems are
also described as furthering the interests of the women involved by helping
them get off alcohol or drugs.
Id.
In Wisconsin v. Kruzicki, a protective custody order was executed stating a young woman's
fetus should remain in a treatment center in the custody of the state. 541 N.W.2d 482,485
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996). This clearly meant as long as the mother carried the fetus within her
body she too would need to remain at the treatment center. See id. at 485. The woman had
been using cocaine during her pregnancy and the court issued the order to protect the fetus.
See id. at 485. The court used Wisconsin's child protection (CHIPS) statute to allow a
juvenile court to assert jurisdiction over the twenty-four-year-old woman and construe a
fetus to fall under the definition of "child." /d. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals denied the
woman's writ of habeas corpus for unlawful detainment and involuntary civil commitment.
See id. at 498. However, the decision was later reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
which found that the case was one of statutory construction. See Wisconsin v. Kruzicki, 561
N.W.2d 729 (1997). Applying principles of statutory construction, the court concluded that
the Legislature did not intend to include a fetus within the Children's Code definition of
child. See id. at 731. The court also found that important social policy issues should be
resolved by the Legislature, not the courts. See id. at 740. See also Carol Gosain,
Protective Custody for Fetuses: A Solution to the Problem of Maternal Drug Use?
Casenote on Wisconsin Ex. Rei Angela v. Kruzicki, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 799 (1997); Lee,
supra note 166.
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Civil commitment satisfies society's retributive urge to hold the woman
accountable for her behavior adverse to the developing fetus. 206 Further,
while some lower courts have considered less restrictive options, the
United States Supreme Court has not ruled that states are required to utilize
a less restrictive treatment approach than civil commitment as a
constitutional requirement. 207 All of these factors suggest that the state has
little incentive to put funds toward voluntary treatment programs and
universal prenatal care when involuntary civil commitment is not
considered an overbroad solution to the problem of drinking during
pregnancy.
Yet another disturbing issue is the type of setting in which a pregnant
woman might be placed for the duration of her involuntary civil
commitment. Options include correctional facilities, mental hospitals,
residential treatment facilities or outpatient treatment settings. 208 Of these
choices, an outpatient setting would be optimal because a woman's liberty
interest would not be unduly compromised. Additionally, if she has other
children, she will not be separated from them for too great a period of time.
However, correctional institutions are often the fIrst places women are sent
if no other suitable facilities are available. 209 Prisons are extremely
inadequate environments for pregnant women. 210 Few offer proper medical
206. See Morse, supra note 22, at 121.
Punitive purpose is a necessary condition of criminal confinement, whereas
civil confinement does not aim to punish. Criminal confinement brands the
detainee as blameworthy; civil confinement stigmatizes the detainee as
nonresponsible. Civil commitment does not require the same procedural
protections as criminal incarceration because the detention is not punishment
and does not carry the same stigma.
[d.

207. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The Court of Appeals ordered
the governmental agency wishing to commit a woman with Alzheimer's disease to consider
less restrictive options, but the court restricted its holding to the facts of the case, which
presented "special features." [d. at 659,662, quoted in Chavkin, supra note 8, at 268.
208. See Chavkin, supra note 8, at 263.
209. See id.
210. See id. See also Linden, supra note 86, at 120; Schroedel & Peretz, supra note 15, at
350. But see Martin, supra note 8, at 340:
The effects of incarceration on pregnancy are controversial. Some reports
suggest that incarceration places pregnant women and their expected infants
at increased health risk because of prison-induced stressors such as the
women's separation from family and friends and the women's concerns
regarding placement of the expected infant (infants are usually placed with a
member of the mother's family soon after birth.) However, other reports
suggest that incarceration may promote the health of some pregnant women
and may foster healthy pregnancy outcomes by supplying these often high
risk women with shelter and regular meals, restricting their alcohol and illicit
drug use, limiting demanding physical work, and providing appropriate
prenatal health care services.
[d. (citations omitted). However, two "exploratory, small-scale investigations on
midwestern U.S. prisoners ... found at least a quarter of the infants born to inmates had
very poor birth outcomes-the infants required stays in neonatal units, died shortly after
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care, the nutritional value of the prison diet is poor and overcrowded
conditions are conducive to the spread of dangerous contagious diseases. 211
The right to privacy and bodily integrity takes prominence in the
Mutual Responsibility discussion of involuntary civil commitment.
Intrusive treatment procedures have been held unconstitutional by recent
judicial decisions because they interfered with the right to privacy and
bodily integrity.212 The Supreme Court has also spoken on the issue of
childbearing as a protected privacy right under the Constitution, affIrming
that an individual is entitled to "independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions" which include childbearing. 213 The state cannot
interfere with this fundamental right.
Griswold v. Connecticut provides one of the strongest examples of the
Court affIrming personal autonomy in relation to the state?14 Connecticut
had passed a statute making it a crime to "use[] any drug, medicinal article,
birth or both." [d. (citations omitted)
21 1. See Chavkin, supra note 8, at 263.
Most prisons have inadequate protocols, staff or training to properly attend
to the special needs of pregnant prisoners. The result has been widespread
deficiencies in diet, nutrition, exercise, and seriously inadequate, if any,
prenatal care. Pregnant women in jail are routinely subject to conditions
which are hazardous to fetal health, such as gross overcrowding, twentyfour-hour lock up with no access to exercise or fresh air, exposure to
tuberculosis, measles and hepatitis and a generally filthy and unsanitary
environment.
[d.
Even though pregnant women need a diet high in proteins, vitamins, and
nutrients, fourteen out of twenty-six prisons in one survey made no special
provisions for providing pregnant [inmates] with special diets or
supplementary vitamins. Only a few prisons have medical care available for
female prisoners twenty-four hours a day and some do not even have
contingency plans for medical needs during the night.
Schroedel & Peretz, supra note 15, at 350.
The miscarriage rate is also quite high in prison environments. See id.
212.See Johnsen, supra note 101, at 615-16.
Courts have held unconstitutional even isolated instances of the type of
intrusions to which pregnant women could be continually subjected. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that the state may not compel criminal
suspects to undergo certain medical procedures, and a federal circuit court
has recognized the right of even involuntarily committed mental patients to
refuse medical treatment. The fact that these prohibited attempts at
intrusions have involved those over whom the state traditionally exerts a
great deal of authority--criminal defendants and mental patients-suggests
the radical nature of the fetal rights trend and its incompatibility with our
heritage of civil liberties. One judge, concurring in an order compelling a
pregnant woman to submit to a cesarean section, acknowledged this
anomaly: "The power of a court to order a competent adult to submit to
surgery is exceedingly limited. Indeed until this unique case arose, I would
have thought such power to be nonexistent."
[d. (citations omitted).
213. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (citing Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977».
214. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
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States Supreme Court held that the law was an egregious encroachment on
marital privacy.216 To enforce the law, the state would conceivably have to
search marital bedrooms for signs of the use of contraceptives. 217 In order
to subject a pregnant woman to civil commitment, a similar type of
monitoring would probably need to occur, especially if a woman is deterred
from going to a medical clinic for fear of mandatory reporting. The only
way the law could catch her in suspect behavior would be to constantly
intrude upon her privacy.
Involuntary civil commitment introduces a particularly thorny problem
into the privacy concerns of the value system analysis. 218 When a state
asserts a compelling or even substantial interest in securing fetal health
through the incapacitation of the mother, there is no "bright line" that
divides permissible and impermissible behaviors. Laws cannot help but be
vague and overinclusive when their basis is the proverbial slippery slope of
constitutional rights analysis. For example, smoking has proven harmful
effects on a fetus. With the increased awareness piqued by the increased
tobacco litigation, it follows that if a mother may be committed for
drinking, a legal activity, she may also be committed for smoking, another
legal activity.z19 Similarly, if a woman engages in dangerous sports or
other activities during pregnancy, could she be committed?220 An all fastfood diet is surely not good for a fetus. The list goes on into seemingly
outrageous private territory.
Further, at what point may the state assert its interest in fetal rights in a
civil commitment proceeding? Do the same viability criteria developed in

215. See id. at 480.
216. /d. at 485. The Supreme Court found that the case concerned a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. See id.
Further, the Court found that the statute, in forbidding the use of contraceptives, rather than
the manufacture or sale, sought to achieve its goals through means that would have a
maximum destructive impact upon the marital relationship. See id. The Court concluded
that such a law could not stand in light of the principle that a "governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms." [d. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288,307 (1964)).
217. See id.
218. But see Amanda E. Verdich, Prosecuting Pregnant Women: Should Washington Take
the Next Step?, 21 SEATILE U. L. REv. 133, 153 (1997) (arguing that greater state
intervention is needed to protect society, including both the mother and the child).
219. See id.
220. See Alcohol Syndrome; Offering Help for Pregnant Alcoholics, STAR. TRIB., Feb. 13,
1998, at 24A. See also Interview with Deborah Thorp, M.D., supra note 8: "I treated a
woman who rode on a three-wheel [all-terrain vehicle] with no brakes and flipped it at 32
weeks [into her pregnancy]. That's at least as much of an egregious insult as someone who
takes a few drinks." See also Lichtenberg, supra note 104, at 389 n.95: "[A] pregnant vegan
vegetarian may choose not to eat any animal products. However, the state could conclude
that a 'reasonable pregnant woman' would drink milk, thus requiring her to conform to this
objective standard or risk liability." [d.
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Roe and Casey apply, or maya state regulate a pregnant woman's behavior
while she is still entitled to abortion on demand?221 The state can assert an
interest in fetal health throughout the gestational term. However, the
problem remains that much of a woman's actions have their greatest impact
on the fetus during the first three months of pregnancy when often a
woman does not even know of her pregnant status. 222 It is unacceptable to
punish a woman for an intentional act for which she had no notice. Such
an attempt would severely infringe upon her civil liberties. Clearly, there
are too many opportunities for the state's interest in protecting fetal rights
to encroach upon the fundamental rights of the mother; the conflict is too
great. Involuntary civil commitment and other punitive measures should
not survive in this very treacherous constitutional landscape.
c)

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

According to a 1988 Gallup poll, 48 percent of the respondents
believed that women "should be held criminally accountable for any
damage the infant suffers as a result of the mother's behavior during
pregnancy. ,,223 A decade later, this attitude persists, manifested in the fact
that women are increasingly being prosecuted for their illegal and legal
behavior during pregnancy. It is here that the maternal-fetal conflict is
most volatile, where maternal duty must meet its highest standards, and
where the potential for disproportionate impact on low-income women and
women of color is glaring.

1) Zimmerman and the Born Alive Rule
The most notorious recent example of prosecuting a woman for her
behavior during pregnancy is State v. Zimmerman, a Wisconsin case that
may set the tone for future judicial and state action across the country. 224
Deborah Zimmerman was in her ninth month of pregnancy and due to
deliver in one week when she was brought to the hospital with a .30 percent
blood alcoholleve1. 225 The hospital elected to perform a cesarean section
because the fetal heart rate was flat and an ultrasound revealed abnormal
226
results.
The defendant claimed she did not want the procedure and
threatened to go home to "drink herself to death" because she did not want
227
her unborn child.
The cesarean was performed and a baby girl was
delivered with a .199 percent blood alcohol level. 228 The child was limp

221. See Greenburg, supra note 108, at 1. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Roe, 410
U.S. at 113.
222. See Johnsen, supra note 101, at 620. See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
223. Sexton, supra note 8, at 411 (citation omitted).
224. No. 96-CF-525, 1996 WL 858598, at *1 (Wis. Cir. Sept. 18, 1996).
225. See id. at *1-2.
226. See id. at *1.
227. Id. at *2.
228. See id.

&

334

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:2

and unresponsive, and displayed the distinctive facial features associated
with FAS?29 A preliminary hearing determined that there was probable
cause to find that the defendant had attempted the first-degree intentional
homicide of her full-term unborn child by knowingly consuming a "nearlethal" amount of alcohol. 230 The hearing also determined that this was
231
A motion to dismiss the case was
first degree reckless conduct.
denied. 232
The Circuit Court defined "human being" in the Wisconsin criminal
statutes to mean "one who has been born alive.,,233 The defendant argued
unsuccessfully that because she consumed the alcohol and made threats in
the hours prior to the birth of her daughter, the conduct could not be
construed as directed toward a person, and thus, she could not be guilty of
attempted first degree intentional homicide. 234 However, the court decided
that because the child was born alive within hours of the defendant's
conduct and that the "destructive effects of the defendant's massive
consumption of alcohol were still ongoing" at the time of birth, she could
235
The effect of this decision is similar to cases
be charged with the crime.
that punish women for the delivery of drugs in the brief moments between
birth and cutting the umbilical cord?36 The court went on to hold that the
"convergence in time of the instrumentality of murder (alcohol)" and when
the fetus became a human being under the Wisconsin statute is sufficient to
hold the defendant responsible for the harm she caused her child?37 The
court concluded that Wisconsin law recognizes that a viable fetus has rights
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See id.
Id. at *1.
See id. at *1.
See id. at *9.
Id. at *3; WIS. STAT. § 939.22(16) (1998).
See Zimmerman, 1996 WL 858598, at *3.
Id.
See id.
A pregnant woman who consumes alcohol should know that it will enter her
fetus. This also is common knowledge. In this case the defendant's
pregnancy was virtually full term. The defendant knew or should have
known that although her drinking might stop at some point, her pregnancy
was at such a stage that the effects of her alcohol consumption would
continue for hours and could reasonably extend into the time when she might
give birth .... The convergence in time of instrumentality of murder
(alcohol) with the victim being born was not instantaneous such as when a
bullet is fired from a gun toward a human target. Nevertheless, the
convergence occurred and the elements of the crime have been established
for probable cause purposes.
Id. But see Johnson v. State, 602 S.2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992) (Florida Supreme Court held
that the legislative history did not show a manifest intent to use the word delivery in the
context of criminally prosecuting mothers for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor
by way of the umbilical cord; and that the lack of legislative intent coupled with uncertainty
that the term delivery applied to the facts of the case compelled construction of the statute in
favor of Johnson).
237. Zimmerman, 1996 WL 858598, at *4.
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238
in relation to certain conduct adverse to its health.
This result opens the door for prosecution of conduct that occurs before
the time of birth is imminent, although the court stopped short of making
further pronouncements in deference to the legislature's power to clarify
the extent to which a viable (or even nonviable) fetus can be protected. 239
Nonetheless, it appears that the Zimmerman Court and prosecution team
attempted to re-characterize Wisconsin's born alive rule to the farthest
extent possible without encroaching upon legislative territory?40 Racine
County District Attorney Joan Korb, who charged Zimmerman in the first
place, was so angered by the case that she was fully prepared to use the
court as a forum for influencing future legislature: "It's an obscenity that
Deborah Zimmerman could attempt to drink her foetus [sic] to death
without any consequences. It should be possible to punish a woman who
threatens her foetus's [sic] life by getting drunk and using drugS.,,241 Judge
Dennis Barry, who ordered Zimmerman to stand trial, has commented that
there is no distinction between fetus and baby in the realm of abuse?42 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court will decide this year whether prosecutors can
charge Zimmerman with attempted first-degree intentional homicide and
first-degree reckless injury.243 Meanwhile, Zimmerman has lost parental
rights to her daughter. 244
Apparently the Wisconsin legislature listened when the court requested
further guidance as to what extent a viable fetus may be protected under the
law. 245 The lawmakers created a bill that would permit the state to put
238. See id. at *6.
239. See id. at *6. "If she had stopped drinking three days, or two days, even the day
before this child was born, there in all likelihood would not have been any evidence of
alcohol in this child's body at birth ... and we would not have been able to charge her with
any crime." Id. at *8 (quoting Sept. 5, 1995 transcript, page 22, lines 1-6; 18-19). The court
asked rhetorically,
[1]s that hypothetical conduct not also the kind that the state has a legitimate
interest in deterring through the possible use of criminal law? Why should a
woman carrying a viable fetus escape responsibility for intentional or
reckless acts; the next logical step for the legislature ... is to create a clear
statement as to what extent viable fetuses can be protected.
Id at *8.
240. See Timothy Lynch, Prosecutors Must Not Act as Legislators, 82 A.B.A. 72 (1996).
"[T]he Zimmerman prosecution is clearly an unauthorized exercise of state power." Id.
241. Krum, supra note 17, at T4.
242. See id. "Others who endanger life by acting under the influence of alcohol or drugs
are held accountable for their behavior," Judge Barry has written. Id. "Why should a
woman carrying a viable fetus escape responsibility for intentional or reckless acts?" Id.
243. See Kevin Murphy, High Court to Hear UW Students' Case, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, May 21, 1998, at 3.
244. See Woman in Fetus Case Loses Parental Rights, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 17,
1998, at 5.
245. See id. at 8-9.
A comprehensive statement from the Wisconsin legislature would provide
guidance in situations where the well-being of a viable fetus is severely
threatened. Notwithstanding the void that currently exists in our state's laws
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246
fetuses exposed to alcohol under the jurisdiction of juvenile courtS.
In
June, Governor Tommy Thompson signed the bill into law that allows the
state to take custody of pregnant women who exhibit a "serious and
habitual 'lack of self-control' in the use of alcohol or drugs.,,247 The law
does not contain criminal sanctions, but does give the state authority to
"..
,,248
.
order a woman Into Inpatient treatment.
2) Stretching the Limits of Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes
South Carolina appears less willing than Wisconsin to await decisive
legislative action on the point of viability. In Whitner v. South Carolina,
the South Carolina high court determined that a viable fetus is a person
under the state's child abuse laws?49 Lawyers representing Cornelia
Whitner, who pled guilty to child neglect after her baby was born with
cocaine metabolites in its system in 1992, appealed the decision to the
United States Supreme Court but certiorari was denied?50
Under the South Carolina children's code, a "child" means a "person
under the age of 18,,,251 the same as in Minnesota. 252 However, the South
Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the statute to mean that "a fetus having
reached that period of prenatal maturity where it is capable of independent
life apart from its mother is a person. ,,253 The court reasoned that because
the state had upheld the viability of fetuses in wrongful death and civil
liability cases, "it would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person
for purposes homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not for
purposes of statutes proscribing child abuse.,,254 The Court also held that
"the consequences of abuse or neglect which takes place after birth often
pale in comparison to those resulting from abuse suffered by the viable
fetus before birth. The policy of prevention [in the children's code]
supports a reading of the word 'person' to include viable fetuses.,,255
The Whitner dissent argued that the majority's decision rendered the
South Carolina child abuse laws vague, leaving pregnant women
potentially liable for any conduct they engage in during pregnancy,

on the subject of crimes against viable fetuses, the unique set of facts ... in
this case ... clearly supports the two criminal charges ....
/d. at 9.
246. See States Look to Detention for Pregnant Drug Users, STAR TRIB., May 2, 1998, at
15A.
247. Herbert, supra note 203, at 13A.
248. See id.
249. 492 S.E.2d 777 (1997).
250. Whitner v. South Carolina, 118 S. Ct. 1857 (May 26, 1998) (No. 97-1562).
251. S.c. CODE ANN. § 20-7-30(1)(1998).
252. See State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625,630 (Minn. 1985).
253. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 780 (citing Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1960)).
254. [d.
255. [d. at 780-81.
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including smoking, drinking or failing to obtain prenatal care. 256 The
dissent pointed out that other hazards in the environment, such as toxins
produced by paint or dry cleaners, can also adversely affect a fetus, as can
contracting diseases like diabetes or cancer. 257 The only law, concluded the
dissent, that could possibly regulate the conduct of a mother toward her
unborn child is an abortion statute under which a viable fetus is treated
differently from a child in being.258
South Carolina is not the only state to interpret its child abuse and
neglect laws to include a fetus. Indiana, Nevada, Florida, and Oklahoma
are among the increasing number of states to recognize this newfound
status for a fetus under state statutes. 259 Courts, as evidenced in
Zimmerman, are following suit. 260 However, child protection legislation
and judicial action is a wholly inappropriate area in which to find
jurisdiction over these cases?61 Child welfare laws are meant to balance
the best interests of the child with family autonomy questions?62 Maternal
health issues, on the other hand, rest entirely on a balancing test that
compares "the state's interest in protecting maternal and fetal health against
a woman's right to bodily integrity.,,263 The wrong law under the wrong
circumstances equals an impermissible state intrusion into women's civil
rights. 264 This trend presents a fundamental conflict with Roe-the judicial
system and state legislatures are acting in an ad hoc manner by
reinterpreting a United States Supreme Court decision that has never been
overruled. Essentially, the cart has been put before the horse: under child
abuse or neglect laws, the state interest is in the health and well-being of a
256. [d. at 786-88.

The majority insists that parents may already be held liable for drinking after
a child is born. This is untrue, however, without some further act on the part
of the parent. A parent who drinks and then hits her child or fails to come
home may be gUilty of criminal neglect. The mere fact of drinking,
however, does not constitute neglect of a child in being.
[d. at 788.
257. See PUNISHING WOMEN FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING PREGNANCY, supra note 18, at
3.
258. See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 786.
259. See Sexton, supra note 8, at 415 n.48. Sexton also points out that Pete Wilson,
during his term as United States Senator from California, campaigned for a Child Abuse
During Pregnancy Prevention Act. See id. "Wilson stated to his fellow lawmakers that 'the
most sordid and terrifying story is that of exploding child abuse through the umbilical
cord. '" [d. In a related action, "Illinois amended the definition of a neglected minor in the
state's Juvenile Court Act to include all children born with controlled substances in their
bodies." [d. (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37 § 2-3(1)(c) (1989))

See State v. Zimmerman, No. 96-CF-525, 1996 WL 858598 (Wis. Cir. Sept. 18,
1996).

260

261. See Wilton, supra note 8, at 167. "[C]hild protection law is inappropriate because it
does not protect the pregnant woman's constitutional right to bodily integrity." [d.
262. See id.
263. [d.

264. See id. at 168.
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child, not a fetus. Laws prosecuting pregnant women for child abuse or
neglect are punitive measures for harming the potential of a child. 265

3) Viability: Where to Draw the Line in the Criminal Arena?
In the minefield created by criminal prosecution of women who drink
during pregnancy, no greater danger exists than the blurred viability lines.
For many women, it may be at least one or two months before they realize
that they are pregnant. By that time, they may have had a few social
drinks, or even drank to excess on one or more occasions. It is during this
time period that studies show the greatest possibility that fetal harm may
occur.266 Therefore, a woman could be guilty of violating a law, and her
only choice in avoiding the threat of prosecution would be to either avoid
drinking altogether or take suitable contraceptive precautions (though even
these offer no guarantee). 267 There are many women who never planned
their pregnancies. This due process quagmire would leave women in a
constant state of alert, a categorically unfair abuse of the law. Courts
would be faced with the unenviable choice of determining when the point
of viability is met. Further, courts would have to decide when the woman
knew she was at this point, a situation that would produce an evidentiary
nightmare. To complicate matters, the state might have to prove that the
woman did not intend to abort the fetus during the first two trimesters of
her pregnancy.268 Statutes would therefore need to define when an offender
must have actual knowledge of the pregnancy.269 Without this notice
requirement, establishing proximate cause becomes an utterly subjective
task: alcohol could be responsible for a birth defect, but so could a genetic
anomaly, medical malpractice, exposure to any number of toxins, or a
trauma (such as an automobile crash or an accidental fall) occurring during
the term of pregnancy.270
Public understanding of fetal viability will become confused because
the course of events described above sets up a vagueness problem which
265. See Oberman, supra note 145, at 528.
266. See Denison, supra note 161, at 1127 n.150.
267. See Susan R. Weinberg, A Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Health?, 58 IND. L.J. 531,
540 (1983). Weinberg suggests that this result could be avoided by setting a reasonableness
standard for liability. For a converse opinion consider John Robertson, who argues that
the state interest in fetal life need not be grounded in Roe [viability], but may
be seen as the logical extension of child abuse and neglect laws. Robertson
theorizes that the child abuse laws are evidence of a mother's 'legal and
moral duty to bring the child into the world as healthy as is reasonably
possible.'
Oberman, supra note 145, at 530.
268. See Weinberg, supra note 267, at 539. "[A]lthough the state may in theory have the
right to intervene in first-trimester pregnancies, it may not prosecute a woman for violating
a maternal duty unless the state could prove that she did not intend to abort." Lichtenberg,
supra note 104, at 389.
269. See Denison, supra note 161, at 1125.
270. See id. at 1126-27.
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could lead to a potentially irretrievable disruption of a woman's privacy
and bodily integrity rights under Roe. Laws punishing a woman for her
actions during the fIrst six months of pregnancy clash with the right to
choose an abortion-a woman could be prosecuted for taking a drink, yet
she is free to obtain an abortion, a procedure that destroys the fetus
. no I
' to thoIS scenano.
. 272
aI together. 271 There IS
OglC
The viability dilemma also calls into question the subject of intent the mens rea requirement of a crime. 273 One commentator suggests that the
intent element for a fetal abuse statute "might consist of knowing that or
recklessly disregarding the likelihood that a child would be born defective
due to the parents' acts.,,274 Again, if a woman does not know she is
pregnant, any number of activities she undertakes, from smoking to going
out dancing in a night club, would fIt this category. Women who are
geographically isolated and do not have ready access to educational
material on the dangers of drinking during pregnancy would be held liable
despite their inadequate notice. Any number of possible scenarios that
comprise 'normal, everyday life' could come into conflict with such a
standard of recklessness. A fetal abuse statute, therefore, would need to
narrow the scope of intent and its timing while also recognizing a
flexibility of circumstances. Otherwise, the law would be too vague and
overbroad in its attempt to cover all of the conceivable bases. Even with
this procedural safeguard, however, any punitive law would have to defIne
maternal duty, and therefore would need to impose a uniform morality.275
Imposition of a uniform standard of liability would set a responsibility
standard that interferes with existing protections afforded by a woman's
fundamental constitutional rights?76 As a result, the maternal-fetal conflict
would be perpetuated.

V. TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OPTIONS AND
INCENTIVES: DEVELOPING AN INCLUSIVE MODEL
Many studies have considered the effectiveness of treatment on alcohol
abuse. However, the bottom line remains that "[t]reatment is better than no
treatment, and the cost of treatment is generally recouped in savings in

271. See id. at 1126.
272. Yet some courts have held in the civil context that if the parents of a fetus know that
proceeding with a pregnancy will result in harm to the fetus, and the child after the birth,
there may be good cause to hold them liable for damages. See Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811 (1980), cited in Denison, supra note 161, at 1126.
273. See DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 102. Mens rea "suggests a general notion of moral
blameworthiness, i.e. that the defendant committed the actus reus of an offense with a moral
blameworthy state of mind." [d.
274. Denison, supra note 161, at 1128.
275. See Denison, supra note 161, at 1128.
276. See id.
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other areas.,,277 Treatment not only addresses the core problem of alcohol
dependency, but it also opens the doors to improvements in other aspects of
an individual's life, including physical health, psychological well-being,
employment opportunities and curbing of criminal tendencies. 278
Therefore, treatment of alcohol abuse must be varied according to an
individual's needs and should be accompanied by treatment of other life
problems that are the result of excessive drinking. 279
The FAS Task Force has proposed many ideas for developing
education, prevention and treatment options that will positively affect both
pregnant women and society at large. However, several important
treatment and education alternatives are missing most notably treatment on
demand, intensive case management within such programs, and creative
incentive programs. An inclusive approach is vital for responding to the
FASIFAE problem. 28o In Maryland, for example, the state legislature
provided over $1 million in start-up funds for The Center for Addiction and
Pregnancy at Francis Scott Key Medical Center, one of the first programs
in the country to employ an entirely voluntary, multidisciplinary approach

277. CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY TREATMENT PLAN, supra note 116, at 8.
The preponderance of evidence demonstrates significant reductions in health
care costs following treatment. A review of cost-offset studies conducted by
employee assistance programs, insurance companies and prepaid health
plans reveals a remarkable consistency in the documented reduction in
health care costs among insured groups. Medical care decreased following
treatment for the treated individual as well as for family members. Savings
over a two- or three-year period following treatment typically exceeded the
costs of treatment.
Id. at 10 (citations omitted). "Study of chemical dependency treatment in Minnesota shows
most costs are offset within one year by savings to the health care and criminal justice
systems." MINN. DEP'T OF HUM. SERVICES CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY DIV., RESEARCH NEWS
(July 1996). Annual cost offsets in Minnesota have been estimated as follows: $7.9 million
in medical hospital costs, $10.8 million in psychological hospital costs, $3.3 million in
Detox Admissions, $9.2 million in DWI arrests, and $8 million in other arrests. MINN.
DEP'T OF HUM. SERVICES, CONSOLIDATED CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY TREATMENT FuND
(1993).
278. See id. at 8-9.
Clients who have developed healthy personal relationships and demonstrated
stable employment histories (even though disrupted by their alcohol and
drug use) have a good prognosis for achieving abstinence from alcohol and
drugs-and reestablishing their former stability. However, the prognosis is
worse for those clients who bring to treatment fewer resources and social
supports.
Id. at 12.
279. See id. at 9. "It is widely believed that 'matching' clients to programs of services that
best meet their needs will improve treatment outcomes." Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
"Chemical dependency treatment can and should be more flexible and client centered."
MINN. DEP'T OF HUM. SERVICES CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY DIY., POL'y NEWS, TREATMENT IN
THE 21 ST Century 1 (April 1997).
280. See Executive Summary, supra note 29. "Cultural, sociological, behavioral, public
health, and medical disciplines are relevant to the prevention of FAS and related
conditions." Id.
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to treating pregnant women addicted to alcohol and drugS. 281
Minnesota is home to a variety of substance abuse treatment and
counseling programs. 282 An informal telephone survey revealed that many
of these centers are open to pregnant substance abusers?83 The FAS Task
Force would like to see more treatment opportunities made available. 284
Under the Mutual Responsibility Approach, treatment should be modeled
on the voluntary, multidisciplinary ideal.
Treatment must be
geographically and economically accessible to all women and must include
provisions for women in need of childcare. 285 Treatment must also be
holistic in its approach, catering to a woman's immediate physical and
spiritual needs. 286 Spirituality is a particularly important aspect of the
Mutual Responsibility Approach because it is the one aspect of an
individual's personal morality that cannot be altered by coercive or
punitive measures.z 87 However, spirituality cannot be a forced concept.
Treatment should incorporate spiritual aspects only if the woman requests
support in this area. Finally, treatment must be aimed toward achieving
lasting results. A revolving door dependency on treatment benefits no

281. See Linden, supra note 86, at 137.
282. A list obtained from the Minnesota Department of Human Services in March 1998
indicated well over 300 residential and outpatient treatment and counseling programs across
the state, many of which purport to serve pregnant women. The types of resources available
in Minnesota include primary inpatient (residential), primary outpatient, extended care,
halfway houses, aftercare, board and lodging for indigent chronic alcoholics and peer
support groups.
Still, resources for treatment remain low on a national basis:
[S]o long as the nation's treatment slots are inadequate to meet the demand
for voluntary treatment, the placement of a woman in treatment through
mandatory measures means that a woman who would enter treatment
voluntarily cannot be served. The system thereby perversely rewards those
women who are unwilling to enter care voluntarily at the expense of those
women who would voluntarily enter care.
Chavkin, supra note 8, at 246.
Washington State has addressed this problem with its Maternity Access Bill which
gives pregnant women priority status with regard to treatment services. WASH. REv. CODE.
ANN. 74.09.760 (1989 & Supp. 1995. Missouri law requires treatment centers to be
available to pregnant women. See Jones, supra note 127, at 1177 (citing S.B. 190, 86th
Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. 1991 Mo. Legis. Servo 226 (1991). "A pregnant woman
referred for substance abuse treatment shall be a fIrst priority user of available treatment. ...
Substance abuse treatment facilities which receive public funds shall not refuse to treat
women solely because they are pregnant." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.731 (West 1998).
283. Telephone survey conducted April 13-15, 1998.
284. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2.
285. See PRACTICAL APPROACHES, supra note 117, at 183.
286. See id. at 190. "The concept of spirituality should not be confused with that of
religion, which is the way we attempt to systemize belief in a higher power through specific
definition and through rituals, rules of conduct and philosophical frameworks. In contrast,
spirituality is not defIned nor constrained by specifIc parameters." [d.
287. See id. at 191. "Spirituality, because it has to do with what (whom) is important to
us, is closely related to values, priorities, goals and preoccupations. It has to do with
whatever is at the center of our life." [d. (citations omitted).
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one. 288 This goal can be met by involving the woman's partner, family and
friends in her recovery process, recognizing and respecting the realities of
her living environment, no matter how bleak, and assisting the woman in
finding ways to overcome the barriers of her addiction to find fulfillment in
her life. 289
Treatment on demand is one solution gradually gaining acceptance in
cities around the country. For example, in San Francisco, California, the
city's Board of Supervisors elected to implement a precedent-setting
treatment on demand program for substance abusers living in poverty.290
The city estimated its annual direct and indirect expenses in relation to
"untreated substance abusers" totaled $1.7 billion annually; $47 million
went toward substance abuse treatment but still 1,300 to 1,800 people were
turned away from service centers on most days.291 The program provides
292
treatment to abusers "within 48 hours" and focuses on perinatal services.
Such a concerted city-wide program allows officials to create a more
systematic, inclusive treatment approach because communicative
relationships are created between programs, city services and the clients
themselves. 293 However, the program has come under some criticism
because of the city's lack of beds and inadequate ongoing funding to assure
treatment on demand is a continuing programmatic goal for the city.294
In Baltimore, Maryland, a program similar in scope to San Francisco's

288. See id. at 192.
289. See id.
290. See California: San Francisco Ponders Plan for Drug Abusers, HEALTH LINE, Nov.
8, 1996. The proposal, "Substance Abuse Treatment on Demand: First Steps", "was put
together ... by a panel of 37 experts, city officials and citizens." William Carlsen, S.F.
Proposes On-Demand Drug Treatment Plan, S.F. CHRON., May 17, 1997, at AI7.
291. [d. See also S.F. Treatment-on-Demand Plan Would Set National Precedent,
ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WK., Nov. 25, 1996, at 1. When introducing the resolution,
Susan Leal, a member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, stated that
[i]f we want to have an impact on homelessness, if we want to reduce crime
and our jail population, if we want to get women off of drugs and get
children out of foster care, then we will make a real commitment to
substance abuse treatment by providing for treatment on demand.
[d. Under the plan, the city "will save at least $7 for every $1 it expends on treatment."
Carlsen, supra note 290, at A17.
292. S.F. Treatment-on-Demand Plan Would Set National Precedent, supra note 290.
293. See id.
The plan calls for 'enhancements' to existing programs, such as ... a series
of new treatment services [including women] .... The report stressed that all
newly funded improvements must be culturally sensitive and linked to other
city services, such as housing, day care, job training, employment, mental
health and legal services .. " For the mother with children, services must
include care and treatment for her family, and protection from being
separated from them simply for seeking treatment ....
[d.

294. See Edward Epstein & Lynda Gledhill, S.F. Considers Crackdown on Public Drunks,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 14, 1998, at AI; Edward Epstein, Flush S.F. Budget Prompts Smiles All
Around, S.F. CHRON., June 2, 1998, at A15.
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program treats addiction as a medical problem rather than a criminal
problem. 295 Funding is directed toward treatment and prevention efforts
296
rather than enforcement and incarceration.
Notably, the city's cause is
being assisted by private philanthropist George Soros, who contributed $25
million to the effort?97 Increased spending by the city will open up 3,000
treatment slots, cutting waiting time from four months to only a few
weeks. 298
San Francisco's and Baltimore's programs focus on drug users, but city
officials recognize that alcohol use usually goes hand in hand with drug
use. With an emphasis placed on pregnant abusers, it seems logical that a
treatment on demand program would give priority to women who drink as
well as those who use drugs. The goal remains the same: both San
Francisco and Baltimore have created unique public and private
cooperative programs that attack broad social problems with an eye toward
long-term solutions to addiction and the side benefit of cutting costs. Both
of these efforts are still in their beginning stages and it will be instructive to
study their success rates over the coming years.
Incentive and support-based programs are another possible option for
Minnesota. A recent study at Oregon State University found that "lowincome pregnant women were far likelier to stop smoking if they were
given vouchers worth $50 a month and had a partner's moral support than
if they got only counseling and self-help literature.,,299 Although it is
considered controversial to 'pay' people to stop their potentially harmful
habits, such efforts often prove successful. 3°O Costs for such incentive
programs are usually made up by potential savings in health care
expenditures. 30l Further, a positive, rather than a punitive or coercive
approach, tends to achieve more immediate and lasting results. Such a
program might be an interesting choice for state officials to consider. For
example, pregnant women could receive vouchers that would apply
towards groceries or baby supplies like formula and diapers in exchange for
their pledge to stop drinking during pregnancy. Vocational rewards, such

295. See Michael Grunwald, Mavericks in the War on Drugs; Baltimore Attempts to Treat
Addiction as Illness, Not Crime, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 1997, at AI.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. Patrick O'Neill, Study: Vouchers Persuade Pregnant Smokers to Quit, STAR TRIB.,
Apr. 12, 1998, at Ell.
After eight months of pregnancy, 34.6 percent of those who received
vouchers were still smoke-free, compared with 9 percent of those who did
not. Two months after they delivered their children, 24 percent of those who
received vouchers were still smoke-free, compared with 5 percent of the
others.
Id.

300. See id.
301. See id.
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as access to job training programs or continuing education, would also be
legitimate options.
Finally, education needs to be rigorous and should begin at an early
age. The FAS Task Force acknowledged that the state must work in
302
cooperation with the alcohol industry to coordinate advertising efforts.
Statewide and local public awareness campaigns should be created that
appeal to females and males, are culturally inclusive and target young
people as well as adults. 303 Prevention messages should also be part of
304
school drug/alcohol education, sex education and parenting classes.
The Mutual Responsibility Approach insists that treatment and
prevention efforts should be positive, nonjudgmental, culturally sensitive
and accessible?05 Programs like treatment on demand and incentive
opportunities can meet these criteria. While many of these efforts are
premised on economic need, state authorities would be wise to explore how
middle- and upper-class women are affected by prevention efforts as well.

VI. CONCLUSION: RE-EVALUATING TRENDS IN
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER THE
MUTUAL RESPONSffiILITY APPROACH
The Mutual Responsibility Approach offers an alternative means to
punitive or coercive legislative and judicial action in response to the
problem of women who drink during pregnancy. The approach starts with
the state. Under the Mutual Responsibility Approach, the state must first
consistently define Roe viability under all criminal and civil laws?06
Viability is not a flexible notion; rather, it is a fixed point determined by
the United States Supreme Court and supported by medical data. 307 When
a woman's individual rights are involved, there is no room for subjective
lawmaking on the viability issue. If a woman and the state are to share in
some reciprocal concept of moral and maternal duty, then viability must
remain the constant that links these highly subjective duties.
When a state relies on a purely objective notion of maternal duty as a
legal indicator for when to take action in cases of gestational abuse, it
endangers a pregnant woman's right to privacy.308 Maternal duty is a
302. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2, at 4.
303. See id. at 12.
304. See id. at 13.
305. A recovering drug/alcohol addict stated that "[p]regnant women who are abusing
drugs and alcohol need to know that someone cares, that they won't be judgmental. High
risk women need to know that services are available, and that support is there for them."
Minneapolis Task Force Hearing, supra note 117. The Mutual Responsibility Approach
attempts to recognize these same needs.
306. See Lichtenberg, supra note 104, at 377.
307. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
308. See Lichtenberg, supra note 104, at 390. ''The right of privacy articulated in Roe
should prohibit the state from intervening to prevent substance abuse in early pregnancy
because the state's interest in protecting potential life is not compelling until viability." Id.
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uniform concept only to the extent that a majority of societies recognize
some form of this theoretical construct. However, beyond this, maternal
duty should be defined in a unique manner by, and not for, each individual
woman. If a state forces a woman to conform to a legislatively or judicially
prescribed concept of maternal duty, it enacts an intolerant legal regime,
one that fails to recognize personal, cultural and gender distinctions. By
respecting a more fluid concept of morality in the realm of maternal duty,
the state perpetuates a legal standard that actually embodies the very spirit
of equal protection analysis. The right of privacy belongs to every
individual despite their pregnant or nonpregnant status. How a pregnant
woman chooses to conduct her life during pregnancy is a private matter to
the extent that the state cannot intervene, at least in the first two trimesters,
unless a complete breakdown of objective and subjective maternal duty
occurs. 309 Any other legislative liberty would elevate fetal rights above
those of a woman, impermissibly conflicting with the Roe analysis and the
Mutual Responsibility Approach posited in this paper.
In sum, legislative action should be directed away from punitive
measures and toward increasing the variety of treatment opportunities
available, including, most importantly, treatment on demand. In so doing,
the legislature avoids laws like legal immunity for mandatory reporting,
which conflict with critical physician-patient privileges and ultimately
deter access to prenatal treatment for many women?lO The FAS Task
Force provided the Minnesota legislature with important guidelines for
fund allocation. 311 As programs develop in the coming years, even greater
attention needs to be paid to self-initiated treatment opportunities favoring
a proactive healing approach that benefits the individual pregnant woman
.
her communIty.
. 312
an d byextensIOn,
In the judicial realm, courts need to avoid the 'creative' use of laws that
do not pertain to the fetus. Child neglect and abuse laws, for instance, were
not meant to apply to the unborn?13 Courts that have chosen to make
examples of women have exceeded the constitutional guarantees of privacy
and strayed into judicial lawmaking in an attempt to satisfy a perceived
public interest in retributive solutions. If this trend continues, the Roe
precedent will become meaningless and we will be faced with the daunting
problem of fifty states who perceive the concepts of viability and privacy in
309. Here legislative action must be particularly careful not to enact vague or overbroad
laws. See Denison, supra note 161, at 1121-22.
310. See supra note 9.
311. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2.
312. See Lichtenberg, supra note 104, at 396. "Voluntary treatment programs avert the
dilemma inherent in state intervention: although the United States Constitution probably
does not prohibit early pregnancy intervention, policy and logic demand that the state not
intervene before viability. Yet, tragically, most of the fetal damage occurs during early
pregnancy." Id.
313. See supra note 205.
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different ways-a judicial anarchy that will hurt gender equality rights. A
similar situation occurred before abortion became legalized.
Disproportionate treatment amongst the states contributed to a dangerous
environment where back-room abortions-accompanied by permanent
injuries and sometimes death-were the norm. 314 Women should not have
to retreat underground while they are pregnant in order to protect their
privacy rights. It is much more reasonable for a state to enable women to
achieve personal maternal duty through resources that support recovery.
The courts need to cooperate with such a system.
The Mutual Responsibility Approach recognizes, overall, that
education is the key to stopping the growth of FAS and FAE within the
population. The FAS Task Force has made many important steps in
targeting learning opportunities for individuals of all ages and both
genders?15 Education may not be the only solution for some women, but it
is far preferable to criminalization or other restrictions of rights that serve
only to frighten away those who need help the most. 316 Under the Mutual
Responsibility Approach, the only cycle perpetuated is one of societal
evolution away from substance abuse during pregnancy. This can be
achieved through accessible, voluntary treatment and education programs
where individual dignity, not public shame, is the standard.

314. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past: Pre-Roe Abortion Law in
Action, 1 VA. 1. Soc. POL'y & L. 309,318-21 (1994).
315. See SUFFER THE CHILDREN, supra note 2.
316. See Denison, supra note 161, at 1140.

